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Why UNRWA Is Never Led by an Arab


Leadership, power, and the deliberate exclusion at the heart of the Palestine refugee system

With less than two months remaining in UNRWA CG’s mandate, and as he appears to be leveraging the closing phase of his term to take far-reaching executive decisions that risk dismantling UNRWA, attention is already shifting to the question of succession.

Who will be the next Commissioner-General? A German? An Italian? A Swiss? A British national? An American? A Swedish or Norwegian candidate?

And yet, conspicuously absent from the discussion is any mention of an Arab national or even a candidate from a host country. Why is that?

Why is it that an agency with such a unique mandate, employing approximately 31,000 Palestine refugees to serve nearly five million Palestine refugees across Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan must invariably be headed by a Western European or American Commissioner-General?

Why is it considered inconceivable for an Arab national, more specifically a candidate from one of the host countries, to preside over an agency that operates almost entirely on their territory, serves their populations, and relies so heavily on their political and social environment?

Take, by contrast, one of the five regional commissions operating within the United Nations system: the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). ESCWA serves 21 Arab States across Western Asia and North Africa, and its Executive Secretary has consistently been appointed from among nationals of those very member States. 

So why is UNRWA, an agency operating almost exclusively in the Arab region and serving a Palestinian refugee population, invariably presided over by a Western-led Commissioner-General?

I argue that this is neither incidental nor accidental. It is deliberate. 

The Commissioner-General of UNRWA is appointed by the Secretary-General following consultations with UNRWA’s Advisory Commission, which includes major donors and host countries. No formal vote or approval by the General Assembly is required. The General Assembly is merely informed of the appointment and has no authority to confirm or reject the candidate.

While UNRWA operates under the authority of the General Assembly, executive authority, including appointment power rests with the Secretary-General. This results in a highly centralized process, devoid of any competitive or transparent selection procedure, with no public shortlisting or clearly articulated criteria.

In practice, political considerations such as donor confidence, geopolitical alignments, and host-state sensitivities play a decisive role in the appointment of UNRWA’s Commissioner-General.

UNRWA’s Commissioner-General is, in effect, a political appointment of the Secretary-General, insulated from direct General Assembly approval.

By contrast, in regional commissions such as ESCWA, the Executive Secretary is appointed through a politically negotiated, intergovernmental process, requiring General Assembly approval and explicit regional buy-in.

This distinction goes directly to questions of accountability, independence, and political leverage and is particularly consequential in the current crisis context.

Since its establishment, ESCWA has been led almost exclusively by Arab nationals, appointed from within the region it serves. By contrast, UNRWA has never been led by a Palestinian, a host-country national, or even an Arab national from a major regional donor State. Its Commissioners-General have been overwhelmingly Western, predominantly European and North American.

This raises, once again, the central question: why has UNRWA never been led by an Arab?

There is no legal rule preventing the appointment of a Palestinian, a Jordanian, a Lebanese, a Syrian, or an Arab national from a major UNRWA donor State. And yet, over more than seven decades, no such appointment has ever occurred.

Instead, UNRWA’s leadership has followed a remarkably consistent pattern: Western nationality, diplomatic pedigree, acceptability to major donor States, and a perceived political “distance” from the refugee community.

The underlying reasons are rarely stated explicitly, yet they are well understood within the system.

First, UNRWA is politically inconvenient. It embodies an unresolved refugee question that powerful States would prefer to manage, contain, or quietly sunset. A Commissioner-General drawn from the refugee community or even from a host State would be more difficult to pressure, harder to discipline, and less easily aligned with donor red lines.

Second, funding equals leverage. Unlike other United Nations entities or regional commissions such as ESCWA, UNRWA is funded almost entirely through voluntary contributions. Western donors do not merely fund the Agency; they actively shape its operating space. Leadership, in turn, is selected accordingly.

Third, control is mistaken for neutrality.
Western leadership is presented as “impartial,” while regional leadership is implicitly framed as “political.” This assumption is neither neutral nor defensible: it simply reflects whose politics are normalized.

Fourth, there is an unspoken trust deficit.
Palestinians are trusted to teach, heal, vaccinate, rebuild and increasingly, to absorb institutional collapse. But they are not trusted to lead.

So who, then, controls UNRWA? And does this amount to a form of colonization of the Palestine cause?

If colonization is understood as the systematic removal of decision-making power from those most directly affected, the answer becomes difficult to avoid

UNRWA serves Palestinians, is staffed overwhelmingly by Palestinians, and operates almost entirely in Palestinian camps and communities; yet it has been led, without exception, by outsiders, overwhelmingly Western.

Those who decide are not those who live with the consequences. Indeed, leadership matters: it shapes how crises are framed, how staff are treated, how cuts are imposed, and how accountability is exercised or avoided. This is precisely what we are witnessing today through mass suspensions, terminations, and salary cuts implemented under the current Commissioner-General of UNRWA.

While the Commissioner-General of UNRWA should, in principle, be accountable to the Palestinian communities the Agency serves, the current governance structure ensures the opposite. By reporting directly to the Secretary-General rather than to the General Assembly, accountability flows upward: to donors and political power centers rather than downward to the Palestinian communities most affected by UNRWA’s decisions.

Why is Arab leadership considered acceptable for every United Nations body operating in the region except the one mandated to serve Palestinians?

Three factors are at play: First, a fear of political alignment with the refugee cause. Second, a fear of challenging donor orthodoxy. Third and most consequential, a deliberate preference to keep UNRWA administratively weak and politically contained.

Why? 

Because a strong, regionally rooted UNRWA leadership would be harder to dismantle.

With less than three months remaining in the current Commissioner-General’s mandate, the most consequential question confronting the Secretary-General and host countries alike is not who comes next, but why Arab leadership continues to be excluded.

Do More Harm: 650 Palestinian Staff Terminated in a Single Day as Lazzarini Accelerates the Dismantling of UNRWA Before His Departure

The Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Philippe Lazzarini, is presiding over the deliberate dismantling of the Agency by terminating Palestinian staff en masse under false administrative pretexts in the final weeks of his mandate.

In Gaza today, acting on his direct instructions, letters of termination are being issued with immediate effect to more than 620 Palestinian teachers, staff who were suspended less than a year ago and deliberately placed into financial asphyxiation through so-called “exceptional leave.” They were removed from work, stripped of income, isolated from their duties, and left in enforced precarity. The same justification recycled without shame is nothing but the ongoing financial crisis.

The termination letters that we have seen and verified assert that

“after careful review, the Commissioner-General has decided, pursuant to Staff Regulation 9.1, to terminate in the interest of the Agency the contracts of staff,”

mechanically appending expressions of “regret” before declaring that employment is terminated “with immediate effect.”

These expressions are false. Each of them. The assertions of “careful review,” “regret,” and “the interest of the Agency” are not merely misleading; they are knowingly untrue and will be exposed before the UN Tribunal. The termination notices rely on formulaic language to mask decisions taken in bad faith, in advance, and for an improper purpose.

The invocation of “the interest of the Agency” is being used to justify the unlawful elimination of Palestinian staff. The claim of “careful review” conceals predetermined outcomes since February 2025. The expression of “regret” serves no legal function other than to cosmetically accompany an otherwise brutal administrative act. These terms are, in fact, misrepresentations deployed to manufacture legality where none exists. Their purpose is to insulate them from accountability, judicial scrutiny, and responsibility.

For twelve consecutive years, UNRWA has operated with an annual deficit ranging between USD 100 to 120 million. At no point during those twelve years was the mass termination of Palestinian staff advanced as a corrective measure. Not because it was overlooked, but because it was never a legitimate option.

UNRWA’s deficit is not an anomaly; it is a known, structural, and politically sustained condition. Donor states have long accepted, indeed, engineered a model in which the Agency functions under permanent financial shortfall. Savings measures, austerity cycles, hiring freezes, and programmatic compression have never eliminated that deficit, nor were they intended to. Yet the Agency has continued to operate, deliver services, and fulfill its mandate every single year under those conditions.

Nothing changed in January 2026 except the decision to terminate hundreds of Palestinian staff in Gaza, Jordan, and soon in Lebanon.

The mandate of UNRWA is not discretionary expenditure. It is a legal obligation to employ Palestinian refugees to serve Palestinian refugees across education, health, relief, protection, infrastructure, and microfinance. For those unaware: staffing with Palestinian refugees is not ancillary to the mandate; it is the mandate.

The termination of teachers is therefore not a budgetary adjustment. It is a deliberate act of mandate dismantlement, executed under the false pretense of financial necessity. What is being reduced is not cost, but Palestinian presence.

The Commissioner-General has no legal or moral authority to hollow out the mandate of UNRWA under the guise of financial management. Authority to administer the Agency does not include authority to dismantle it, and the CG’s budgetary discretion does not extend to extinguishing the very purpose for which the Agency exists.

The obscenity of these decisions is entrenched in the hierarchy that sustains them. The Acting Director in Gaza, a white Western European male installed through a procedurally unlawful appointment in direct violation of governing rules, as confirmed by an investigation under the Secretary-General’s authority, continues to occupy his position without consequence, earning over USD 17,000 per month, while terminating Palestinian teachers whose monthly salaries barely reach USD 1,000.

The administration now invokes urgency, inevitability, and the alleged absence of alternatives. None withstands scrutiny. The financial conditions cited are longstanding and well-known, and the timing exposes the design. Terminations are being carried out while collective appeals challenging the unlawful suspensions remain pending before the Tribunal, and while the Commissioner-General is approaching the end of his mandate.

More than 420 of these teachers have already filed a collective appeal with the UN Tribunal, challenging the legality of their suspensions and the denial of their salaries. The Commissioner-General’s sudden acceleration toward termination is nothing but a calculated attempt to render pending appeals moot by invoking Staff Regulation 9.1 and declaring, after careful review, that their contracts are ended in the interest of the Agency. Decisions are being rushed to pre-empt judicial review and to entrench faits accomplis before accountability can attach.

This is, in fact, the opening phase of a broader strategy that extends across UNRWA’s fields of operation, staff categories, and duty stations. The pattern is already replicating.

In Amman last Thursday, the Director of Security, another white Western European male whose appointment was also contested before the UN Tribunal, issued termination letters to 20 Palestinian security staff, barring them from UNRWA premises with immediate effect. Staff were informed that their functions would be outsourced to a private security company in order to “align with the rest of the UN system.”

That justification does not withstand even minimal legal scrutiny.

UNRWA is not a generic UN entity. Its mandate is singular and non-transferable: to employ Palestinian refugees in the service of Palestinian refugees. The outsourcing of Palestinian security functions to private contractors constitutes an ultra vires action. It exceeds administrative authority by displacing Palestinian staff from posts that are integral to UNRWA’s mandate. Procurement is being misused as a vehicle to achieve an outcome that management could not lawfully impose directly: the systematic exclusion of Palestinians from their own institution.

The invocation of “alignment” functions as a pretext to legitimize discriminatory impact, whereby Palestinian staff are removed en masse while senior international positions remain untouched. The financial disparity is undisguised. The Director of Security earns between USD 12,000 and 13,000 per month. The Palestinian staff he terminated earn approximately USD 800 per month. Senior management positions remain untouched; Palestinian livelihoods are declared expendable.

The moral arithmetic speaks for itself.

In Beirut, preparations are underway for the same maneuver. Approximately 100 Palestinian staff are expected to face termination under identical pretexts, using the same administrative language and the same manufactured justifications.

These measures are being executed at the very beginning of the year, and in the final weeks preceding the Commissioner-General’s departure at the end of March, the formal conclusion of his contract. This is the terminal phase of a policy implemented with the knowledge that accountability will soon be evaded through exit.

Following the closure of UNRWA’s Jerusalem headquarters, the dismantling has shifted inward. Field offices and headquarters are now being systematically hollowed out through attrition, termination, and outsourcing. The pattern is consistent, sequential, and intentional. This trajectory mirrors, with precision, the long-articulated objective of the Israeli government: the dismantling of UNRWA not through formal abolition, but through internal erosion: reducing staff, extinguishing functions, and stripping the Agency of its Palestinian core while preserving the façade of institutional continuity.

What is unfolding is a systematic, progressive, controlled disintegration.

When the Commissioner-General assumed office, UNRWA’s staffing table reflected approximately 31,000 Palestinian staff positions, including 13,000 in Gaza. These figures are still cited publicly, with confidence and repetition.

They are false.

Insider data confirms that UNRWA’s staffing has fallen to approximately 23,000 positions. Posts have been abolished incrementally and without transparency, with the most severe acceleration occurring over the past two years. In Gaza alone, staff numbers have collapsed from 13,000 to approximately 9,000, a consequence of deaths caused by Israeli attacks, forced retirements, and now, deliberate mass termination.

The plan is no longer deniable.

UNRWA is being dismantled from within by a senior Western European management cohort that continues to invoke humanitarian language while administering collective punishment against Palestinians, many of whom are simultaneously mourning family members killed by the very government whose political objectives these measures now advance.

No Western European Director or senior official within UNRWA has demonstrated the moral courage to halt these actions. None has objected. None has refused to execute them. These officials retain their positions by implementing decisions without scrutiny or resistance. Their allegiance is not to the mandate, nor to Palestinian refugees, but to institutional survival. In that sense, they operate as mercenaries: well compensated, insulated from consequences, and valued only for their willingness to comply.

As for the Commissioner-General, he has nothing to lose. His term ends in March 2026. His exit is secured. The same is likely true for those closest to him. Decisions are taken with the certainty that consequences will not follow. Quite the opposite: they are likely to be rewarded; absorbed into other senior roles, compensated by Western governments that continue to support Israel’s genocide against the Palestinian people, and repositioned within the UN system to carry forward the same discriminatory practices under different institutional banners.

The decision to terminate 650 Palestinian staff in a single day, taken in the final weeks of the Commissioner-General’s tenure, is unprecedented in the history of both the United Nations and UNRWA. Such a measure: massive in scale, irreversible in effect, and executed at the very end of an executive mandate, raises serious questions about the continued propriety of allowing the Commissioner-General to exercise unfettered executive authority. When a senior official accelerates irreversible decisions at this scale immediately before departure, the issue is no longer administrative discretion but abuse of authority in anticipation of exit.

This conduct warrants scrutiny not only of the decision itself, but of the conditions under which it was taken. Reasonable questions arise as to whether assurances have been given, whether consequences have been neutralized in advance, and whether accountability has been effectively suspended. In any other institutional context, such circumstances would trigger immediate restraint, oversight, or the withdrawal of delegated authority.

Where, then, is the Secretary-General of the United Nations in all of this? What justification exists for permitting a departing Commissioner-General, Philippe Lazzarini, to take decisions of historic magnitude in the final months of his tenure, with consequences that will long outlast his presence and fall entirely on Palestinian staff?

In mythology, when power abandoned humanity, it was Prometheus who defied it, who stole fire knowing the cost, not for recognition, not for permission, but because survival demanded action. He did not wait for consensus. He acted because inaction meant destruction.

Who, then, will act for Palestinian UNRWA staff?

Who will defy the machinery rather than continue to service it? Who will intervene when legality is being weaponized and procedure is being used to erase livelihoods?

Palestinian UNRWA staff are being erased while the world watches it happen in real time. Some are burying their families. Others are sleeping in shelters. And now they are being told, formally, politely, with immediate effect, that even their livelihoods are no longer allowed to survive.

This is how a mandate is killed: quietly, disingenuously, and from within, by the very official, Mr. Lazzarini, charged with safeguarding it, in direct violation of the oath attached to his office.

So where is Prometheus now? Who will defy power when survival demands it, rather than administer harm in its name?

The humanitarian system rests on a single, non-negotiable premise: do no harm. What is unfolding here is its deliberate inversion: do more harm. Terminate more Palestinian staff. Remove livelihoods. Deepen displacement. Align administrative decisions with the Israeli government’s long-stated objective of dismantling UNRWA and reducing the Palestinian presence in Gaza.

Yes: Do More Harm: Systematically and with Intent: One Termination Letter At A Time.

Not because it is lawful. Not because it is unavoidable. But because those authorizing it are insulated from its consequences, and because they calculate that Palestinian lives, Palestinian labour, and Palestinian rights can be extinguished administratively without cost.

This is how senior officials like Lazzarini participate in erasure: by choosing harm, authorizing it on paper, and enforcing it without ever having to fire a single shot.

Palestinians will remember you because you failed to protect them, failed to uphold the mandate entrusted to you, and willingly chose to inflict harm upon them, no different, in the end, from those who openly act as their enemy.

A Case of Déjà Vu: Judge Buffa and the Reversal of Sexual Misconduct Judgments

A critical legal analysis of UNDT Judge Buffa’s jurisprudence on sexual harassment, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation.

Despite having issued four separate UNDT judgments in sexual harassment, assault and exploitation cases in which he exonerated the perpetrators, rescinded their terminations, and awarded up to two years’ compensation in lieu, even after every single one was subsequently vacated by UNAT, UNDT Judge Buffa appears determined to persist in what can only be described as a judicial crusade to rehabilitate UN staff members found to have sexually harassed, sexually assaulted, raped or exploited their female colleagues.

What is glaring is not merely that UNAT has repeatedly nullified his judgments, it is that Judge Buffa continues to ignore, dismiss, or otherwise sidestep UNAT jurisprudence in areas where UNAT has already resolved the legal issue and articulated binding standards. The jurisprudential message from UNAT to Judge Buffa has been categorical. Yet Judge Buffa proceeds as though these precedents are advisory rather than binding, as though the legal reasoning of higher judicial authority is optional, and as though his personal interpretive framework supersedes the institutional legal regime.

In earlier writings dating back to 2023, I asked: What explains such a sustained departure from appellate jurisprudence? By what logic does a sitting judge repeatedly arrive at interpretations that UNAT has already rejected? How could a judge charged with administering the internal justice system arrive at legal conclusions so dramatically misaligned with the Organization’s zero-tolerance framework and repeatedly contradicted by appellate review?

At the time, I argued that the cultural priors and embedded social beliefs of the Judge, particularly those regarding gender, sexuality, power, and consent were not incidental to his rulings, but constitutive of them. I referenced the 2007 Duke Law Research Paper by Jennifer Zimbroff, which observed:

“studies of sexual harassment perception are not intended to answer whether any specific plaintiff’s circumstances satisfy the legal criteria for sexual harassment. Rather, they serve to demonstrate the potential differences with which victims, alleged perpetrators, judges, and juries perceive and consider appropriate handling of unwelcome sexualized approaches. Such studies may demonstrate how the cultural affiliations of different judges and jurors will influence their perceptions of whether sexual harassment occurred and, if so, was responded to appropriately.”

This is manifest in Judge Buffa’s judicial output. After reviewing all of Judge Buffa’s UNDT judgments in which he nullified or declined to substantiate sexual misconduct, all of which were later vacated entirely by UNAT, the pattern is unmistakable. His legal reasoning consistently reflects a viewpoint that normalizes male sexual entitlement and places the burden of reaction, resistance, articulation, and proof upon female victims. In so doing, he treats women’s testimony as unreliable, their silence as consent, their embarrassment as acquiescence, and their reluctance to report as insignificance.

In other words: his jurisprudence reveals a consistently gendered epistemology of disbelief.

The UNDT Code of Conduct for Judges requires fairness in proceedings and explicitly prohibits sexist or discriminatory conduct. UNDT Judges are obligated to uphold the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the ICCPR documents rooted in dignity, bodily autonomy, and equality before the law. Further, UNDT Judges are appointed by the General Assembly upon recommendations of the Internal Justice Council in consultation with OHR.

We therefore ask the Internal Justice Council and the General Assembly directly:

How can a UNDT judge whose judgments repeatedly erode the credibility of women reporting sexual misconduct; judgments that have systemically and consecutively been repudiated by UNAT, be said to meet the standard of impartiality and integrity expected under the UNDT judicial mandate?

Judge Buffa is not advancing the Secretary-General’s zero-tolerance framework for sexual harassment, sexual exploitation, and sexual abuse. In fact, his most recent judgment makes one reality brutally clear: the price that women pay when they report sexual misconduct is professional risk, reputational threat, and exposure to retaliation, while the alleged perpetrator is offered the jurisprudential shelter of Judge Buffa’s reasoning.

Unless a case of sexual violence meets an almost impossible standard (one approaching forensic documentation) Judge Buffa’s instinct is to clear the accused. Whether the staff member verbalized sexual comments, circulated pornographic imagery, engaged in invasive contact, or weaponized professional authority through sexual innuendo and sexual acts, Judge Buffa appears unwilling to attribute legal gravity to the act unless the violence is so explicit as to be undeniable.

May we therefore ask the Internal Justice Council and OHR: what safeguards are in place to ensure that UNDT judges, who are entrusted with adjudicating claims of harassment and abuse, do not themselves perpetuate the very attitudes that normalize such misconduct?

How can we ensure that those chosen to sit in judgment are truly aligned with the Organization’s legal commitments and ethical imperatives?

In case after case, Judge Buffa introduces interpretive thresholds that shift the burden of proof onto women and dilute the legal definition of harassment into a form of harmless social mischief.

Case No 1: Conteh v. Secretary-General, Judgment No. UNDT/2020/189

In Conteh, Conteh v. Secretary-General, Judgment No. UNDT/2020/189 (6 November 2020), Judge Buffa built a narrative of minimization around the perpetrator’s conduct. He characterized the groping, grabbing, and physical intrusion into women’s bodies as merely “episodic,” “not threatening,” and “without specific consequences,” even noting approvingly that the staff member “gave up the harassment when he understood that his ‘rude advances’ were not accepted.” In Judge Buffa’s view, the misconduct had “no impact (or at least a very limited impact) on the work environment,” and, most revealingly, he opined that “the heaviest disciplinary sanctions would perhaps have been appropriate if the investigators had found evidence that the Applicant had engaged in sexual relationships with his subordinates but they did not.”

Judge Buffa’s standard in Conteh appears to be: unless the misconduct crosses into explicit sexual intercourse, it cannot warrant dismissal. And so he rescinded the termination decision and ordered compensation in lieu.

UNAT’s response was unequivocal UNAT Judgment (appeal, reversal) Conteh v. Secretary-General, Judgment No. 2021-UNAT-1171. It found that Judge Buffa’s limitation of termination “only to instances of inappropriate sexual relationships” was “without authority or merit” and actively “undermines the broad spectrum of sexual harassment that can and does occur.” UNAT went on to reassert a core legal principle:

“there should be no requirement for the conduct to be repetitive,” and “one instance could conceptually be sufficient” for separation. Moreover, UNAT held that sexual harassment “does not require any concrete or palpable result,” and that “unwelcome advances and inappropriate behaviour towards colleagues such as touching their body parts… are per se grave enough to cause harm.” It further reminded Judge Buffa that the offence is not dependent on “ill intent,” nor on the frequency of professional interactions, which are “a minor element” under a zero-tolerance policy.

Conteh thus reveals the core of Buffa’s jurisprudence: sexual harm, in his view, must be physically extremerepeated, or visibly harmful in order to qualify as harassment. The effect is consistent: a systemic raising of evidentiary thresholds for victims and a lowering of accountability thresholds for perpetrators. Conteh is the jurisprudential seed from which Judge Buffa’s future exonerations sprouted.

Case No 2: UNDT Judgment: Szvetko v. Secretary-General, Judgment No. UNDT/2022/026

The Szvetko judgment exposes Judge Buffa’s cultural comfort with sexualized male behaviour disguised as mischief. Here, Judge Buffa treated comments such as “your breasts look like mountains” and inviting a female colleague to imagine the “pleasure” of water jets “between a woman’s legs,” and even the showing of nude male genitalia, as “euphoric jokes,” “boutades,” and as behaviour akin to “a boy on a school trip,” devoid of any intention to humiliate.

Once again, Judge Buffa’s eye is on the man, his mood, his context, his lack of maliciousness, rather than the impact on the women subjected to this conduct. The degradation of a professional woman into a sexual object is framed as childish play. Judge Buffa concluded that the misconduct “was not severe in nature” and again portrayed the perpetrator as merely exuberant rather than predatory.

UNAT’s reversal was devastating (UNAT Judgment (appeal, reversal):
Balint Szvetko v. Secretary-General, Judgment No. 2023-UNAT-1311).  It found Judge Buffa’s interpretation “speculative,” noted that he had “disregarded the evidence,” and reaffirmed the applicable legal framework. Crucially, UNAT held that this behaviour “exhibits a disposition which caused the complainants significant discomfort and anxiety and impacted their ongoing professional relationship,” and that Judge Buffa’s conclusion that the misconduct lacked severity because it occurred briefly was legally untenable. The Tribunal rejected Judge Buffa’s trivialization of pornographic exposure, stating plainly that “showing a colleague a picture of a penis can cause offence or humiliation,” and that “all individuals are entitled to be free of this kind of puerile behaviour.” The conduct, UNAT clarified, “violates the obligation of an international civil servant to uphold the highest standard of integrity,” and “naturally would undermine professional confidence.”

Here, Judge Buffa’s habitual logic becomes unmistakable: women must tolerate sexually explicit intrusion so long as the perpetrator can be framed as joking, playful, inebriated, or boyish. It is the judicial romanticization of male entitlement. Under Judge Buffa’s lens, women are expected to be resilient, unaffected, unhumiliated, and if they are humiliated, it is dismissed as hypersensitivity.

Szvetko mirrors Conteh in dismantling the same Buffa principle: that a woman must prove explicit distress, explicit damage, explicit consequences to her career rather than simply the fact of being sexually objectified in the workplace.

Case No 3: UNDT Judgment (with Buffa’s dissent): AAE v. Secretary-General, Judgment No. UNDT/2022/030

In AAE, Judge Buffa’s dissenting opinion exposes the apex of his judicial perspective on sexual violence. Faced with a case in which a D-1 Director raped a colleague after she told him she did not want sex and attempted to leave, Judge Buffa turned to the woman’s behaviour; not to the man’s actions,  as the decisive factor. He invoked her “friendly disposition” as “exculpatory,” and he questioned how rape could occur when the woman did not scream, did not physically struggle, and did not reiterate her objection multiple times. His reasoning assimilates friendliness into invitation and silence into consent. It asks, implicitly: why didn’t she resist harder?

But your Honour:

A Kiss is not a Free Pass for Sex.
A kiss is not a contract. and;

Silence under shock is not consent.

UNAT’s full bench demolished this reasoning UNAT Judgment (full bench): AAE v. Secretary-General, Judgment No. 2023-UNAT-1332. It held that the Director had engaged in “non-consensual sex… amounting to sexual assault,” and that relying on tacit consent or the absence of repeated objections was legally invalid. UNAT affirmed that sexual assault can occur “without threats of violence,” particularly within a power-imbalanced relationship, and accepted the victim’s explanation that she did not scream because she was “in shock,” “ashamed,” and “cognizant of her precarious situation.”

Here, as in Conteh and Szvetko, Judge Buffa’s analysis repeatedly turns to female reaction, rather than male action, as the evidentiary hinge. The woman carries the burden of proving fear; the man is relieved of the burden of proving respect. The judicial gaze is male-centric: what mattered to Judge Buffa was not whether the man violated the woman’s autonomy, but whether the woman reacted loudly enough to convince him.

Case No 4: UNDT Judgment: Makeen v. Secretary-General, Judgment No. UNDT/2023/071

In the Makeen case, Judge Buffa again applied his consistent judicial relativism around sexual harm, this time in the context of sexual exploitation. Here, the perpetrator was a 53-year-old married UN staff member who repeatedly engaged in sexual acts with an 18-year-old impoverished woman who cleaned his home, cooked for him, and was economically dependent on him. Yet Judge Buffa saw no power dynamic, no coercive context, no vulnerability, only “consensual” sexual interaction “pertaining to the Applicant’s private life.”

This reasoning is revealing: Judge Buffa treats power disparity as irrelevant if the victim technically agreed to be present, or did not explicitly object, or,  in this case,  was merely young, poor, unprotected, and dependent. He reads “consent” where the law sees coercion by circumstance.

UNAT’s reversal was once again categorical (Makeen v. Secretary-General, Judgment No. 2024-UNAT-1461). It held that:

“Consent is immaterial to the offence of sexual exploitation and abuse.”

With that single sentence, UNAT dismantled Judge Buffa’s entire operative premise. It went further:

“V01 was unable to fully consent due to the unequal relationship and power imbalance that existed between her and Mr. Makeen.”

Here, UNAT stated plainly what Judge Buffa refused to see: that consent is not a matter of mere verbal or physical acquiescence, but must be free of dependency, intimidation, and deprivation. The Tribunal stressed that the perpetrator held “a position of trust and support,” and that the victim’s “economic and social status put her in a state of dependency.”

UNAT also directly contradicted Judge Buffa’s claim that the misconduct pertained to private life:

“the duty of staff members to act with integrity… extends to their conduct both within and outside the workplace due to the potential reputational damage their adverse actions may cause to the Organization.”

Once again, Judge Buffa shielded a male UN actor by shrinking the scope of accountability to the boundaries of the bedroom, as though sexual access to a dependent teenager employed in one’s home were merely private recreation. UNAT restored the definition of sexual abuse to its legal and ethical meaning: exploitation of vulnerability, not romantic interaction. This case illustrates transactional sex under conditions of imbalance, dependency, and vulnerability. If a young woman cooks your meals, cleans your floors, and is financially dependent on you,  she cannot freely consent.

Judge Buffa’s approach in Makeen reveals his intellectual consistency: in Conteh, he could not see harm unless it disrupted work; in Szvetko, he could not see harassment unless accompanied by ill intent; in AAE, he could not see rape unless force or screaming occurred; and in Makeen, he could not see exploitation unless the victim explicitly vocalized objection despite dependency.

All these judgments clearly point to repetition of Judge Buffa’s cultural assumptions about women’s consent.

Case No 5: UNDT Judgment: Samarasinha v. Secretary-General, Judgment No. UNDT/2025/047 (July 2025) UNAT: appeal pending (not yet adjudicated at appellate stage)

And then we arrive at Samarasinha, the newest UNDT judgment issued in July 2025;  the one where Judge Buffa again cleared a male senior official at the D-1 level despite testimonies from multiple women and corroborating diplomatic witnesses.

Here the pattern repeats so perfectly it becomes almost formulaic. Even though there were clear shortcomings in the OIOS investigation, Judge Buffa went on to dismiss another allegation of sexual assault because the victim was drunk, because the recollection was not detailed twelve years later, because she had “flirtatious behaviour”  as though intoxication invalidates memory and flirting invalidates violation.

Judge Buffa wrote:

“a recollection… in a context of flirtatious behaviour… cannot substantiate an accusation of sexual assault, notably where the recollection of the events are not detailed and not lived by a sober person.”

Once again, Judge Buffa  implies that a woman who was intoxicated cannot be sexually assaulted because she cannot remember explicitly enough to satisfy him.

He even dismissed the victim’s account of being pinned in bed as “weak,” and deemed the surrounding allegations “almost meaningless” and “without relevance.” He trivialized repeated physical contact, the staring at breasts, and the delivery of invitations laced with sexual undertones as “insignificant.” He wrote that these acts lacked “sexual connotation,” as though a senior official touching a woman’s hips and waist “while inebriated” somehow falls within acceptable social interaction in Judge Buffa’s mental universe.

And most tellingly, he declared that even cumulatively, these acts were “unable to substantiate… a behaviour of a gravity able to justify a measure like ALWOP.”

In other words: even if multiple women say it, even if they say it over time, even if external witnesses corroborate it, Judge Buffa does not find it serious.

Across these judgments, a consistent evidentiary posture emerges: women’s testimony is approached with skepticism, while male conduct is interpreted through a lens of benign intent. The result is a repeated downgrading of coercive acts into social misunderstandings and a systemic reluctance to attribute legal weight to female experience. This judicial orientation constitutes an epistemic bias,  a presumption of male innocence that persists even in the face of multiple corroborating accounts and sustained patterns of behaviour.

This consistent minimization of sexual misconduct,  repeated across ContehSzvetkoMakeenAAE, and now Samarasinha,  constitutes what I refer to as the Buffa Doctrine.

The United Nations has repeatedly affirmed that it upholds a zero-tolerance policy toward sexual harassment, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation. Yet in practice, zero tolerance is meaningless when judicial interpretation becomes a filter that drains these standards of substance. The question is no longer whether Judge Buffa’s judgments are legally flawed: UNAT has already established that by vacating four of them and will likely do the same with the fifth. The question is whether the internal justice architecture will continue to tolerate a judicial approach that repeatedly diminishes the gravity of sexual misconduct and re-centres sympathy on the perpetrators rather than the victims.

The Judges of the UNDT are not freelancers. They are appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Internal Justice Council, precisely because the legitimacy of their office derives not from personal opinion but from fidelity to the Organization’s legal framework. When a UNDT judge develops an identifiable pattern of jurisprudence that contradicts UNAT’s established standards, repeatedly, and in the same direction, affecting the same class of victims, it is no longer a matter of individual interpretation,  it becomes a matter of institutional accountability.

Judge Buffa’s judicial reasoning, across these cases, does not advance the UN’s commitments under the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the ICCPR. It does not uphold the Secretary-General’s professed principles of zero tolerance. It does not protect women in the system who report sexual misconduct. It does, however, provide a signal, loud, clear, unmistakable,  to every perpetrator who might consider testing boundaries: that if their actions fall short of cinematic brutality, there is a judge who may well reinterpret coercion as misunderstanding, predation as exuberance, and violation as miscommunication.

So we must ask: how many times must a judge be reversed: four? five? six?  before someone in authority acknowledges the pattern?

When does the Internal Justice Council intervene? When does the General Assembly exercise its oversight responsibility?

And how many women in the UN must endure professional retaliation, reputational harm, and psychological damage because a judge’s cultural biases consistently discount their experiences?

Precedent is the true expression of judicial philosophy. And Buffa’s precedents: overturned, contradicted, and repudiated,  speak to a persistent bias incompatible with impartial adjudication.

“Having a Baby in Africa Is Nothing”: The UN’s Moral Collapse

“I would not let the UN teach me morals. Having a baby in Africa is nothing. Where one has a baby, she wanted a baby. How many people have babies here? The UN does not understand that. The UN thinks that she has been victimized by the UN staff who came. No, it’s the opposite.”

This was the shocking statement of a MONUSCO international staff member to the UN tribunal after he was dismissed for sexual exploitation and abuse of a local woman in Goma.

Last week, the UNDT rendered a damning judgment UNDT/2025/089, Compaore v. Secretary-General, which evidences a systemic collapse of compliance with the principle of “do no harm” among UN international staff and highlights the widening gap between the Organisation’s proclaimed norms and its operational realities.

What the Tribunal recounts next reveals a level of predation that documents the institutional inability to give effect to every policy, every training, and every public assertion that the Organisation upholds the principle of ‘do no harm”. 

“The staff member met the local woman when she was selling vegetables on the roadside in Goma took her number and, within days, he was having regular sexual intercourse with her.

He knew that there was a notable status differential between him, an international United Nations staff member and the SEA survivor, a seller on the market in Goma.

The woman earned between USD 10 and USD 25 per month… she was also supporting her ten-year-old son. By contrast, the staff member’s net salary was approximately USD 14,000 per month.

He visited her at her house and started giving her significant sums of money up to half of her month’s earnings as well as promised to help opening her own business…

…when the victim informed him that she became pregnant as a result, he reacted angrily, and called her a ‘prostitute’ and ‘thief,’ telling her to leave his house.

He then took the local woman far to meet with a pharmacist that he knew, using a UN vehicle. At the location of the pharmacist, he asked her to do a pregnancy test, which was positive.

He then asked the pharmacist how they could arrange an abortion even though the local woman informed him that she did not want to abort. He then organized a meeting at a hotel in Goma, during which the pharmacist pressured the local woman to get an abortion; and he gave her US$ 400.00 (i.e. the equivalent of four months’ income or seven months’ rent for her) to financially incentivize her to get an abortion.

After giving her the money for an abortion, he filed a criminal complaint against her, accusing her of harassing him and of claiming money from him. In his complaint, he requested the police to verify if she was still pregnant, while being aware that abortion is a criminal offence in the DRC.

He then made the local woman sign an agreement in exchange of USD 8,000 payment. As part of this agreement, the local woman also signed a letter withdrawing allegations against him which were then pending in the local court.”

I mean if this is the outcome of years of UN training on “do no harm” then we are forced to confront the undeniable truth: something is not merely broken: something is rotten at the core. And perhaps the deeper tragedy is this: people have become so accustomed to this pattern of abuse that they have grown desensitized to it. These cases no longer shock; they are absorbed as routine background noise.

We must ask ourselves: who is reading these stories? Who is outraged? And why is this not shaking the Organisation to its foundations?

What is truly galling is that the international staff member stood before the Tribunal and insisted the relationship was consensual. The Tribunal, drawing on Makeen 2024-UNAT-1461, para. 52, citing Lucchini rejected this narrative entirely, establishing that in the face of glaring economic deprivation and an overwhelming power differential, genuine consent was impossible. Sex in such a situation is inherently coercive and any claimed consent collapses under legal and ethical scrutiny.

The Tribunal also held that the survivor’s “withdrawal of the complaints in domestic proceedings, following an $8,000 financial settlement,” does not absolve the perpetrator nor constrain the UN’s authority to act, since national acquittals do not extinguish administrative responsibility.

The staff member disputed the proportionality of his dismissal, arguing that a mere reprimand or censure would have sufficed. This position attempts to recast predatory conduct as a correctable misjudgment rather than misconduct of such severity that it renders continued employment untenable. It is a defence that collapses on its face when measured against the Organisation’s core obligations and basic standards of conduct.

The problem is just like the genocide in Palestine, people have become used to harm so much that these stories pass almost unremarkable. And the UN surely counts on this. 

Then comes the United Nations General Assembly, A/79/789, “Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse – Report of the Secretary-General” (17 February 2025). One can clearly notice how its very architecture, dense tables, aggregated indicators, and technical phrasing render the issue abstract, sterile, and distant. It categorizes suffering into percentages and trendlines, burying the human cost beneath methodology. In contrast, when one goes to the UN’s publicly accessible UN SEA misconduct data dashboard, the information is stark: individual dates, victims under 18, allegations of rape, the implementing entities involved. The dashboard is revealing, but almost no one consults it and certainly the Organisation benefits from that neglect.

The Secretary-General’s report reduces survivors to numerical entries processed through a statistical frame that neutralizes emotional and moral response. As with the enumeration of Palestinian casualties, human beings are converted into data units. Numerical abstraction becomes the mechanism of desensitization.

Let me give you a few examples of what the dashboard reveals.
Under the category of UN staff and related personnel:

  • Less than a week ago,  on 20 and 21 November,  two separate allegations were recorded against WHO personnel for sexual exploitation.
  • On 30 October, an allegation was filed against IOM for rape of a child by a UN Volunteer.
  • On 23, 21 and 20 October, three distinct allegations were filed for sexual assault of children under 18 in both IOM and UNRWA.

According to the same data, for 2024, children constituted 15% of victims, and disturbingly, an additional 17% were listed as “victim age unknown.” That alone illustrates how incomplete or deliberately under-specified the reporting is. For the same year, rape accounted for 13% of allegations, and sexual assault 20%. Assistance was provided in only 20% of cases, with the remainder categorized on the dashboard as “victim declined,” “victim did not seek assistance,” “victim unidentified,” or “victim unreachable.” This is the measure in practice of “do no harm” and of the supposed restoration of victims’ dignity.

Then there is the separate category of implementing partners whose personnel are not formally under UN authority but who execute UN-funded projects. 

  • On 4, 8, 9, 19 and 28 November 2025, five allegations were lodged for sexual assault, two involving children under 18 in connection with UNICEF-supported activities. 
  • On 9, 14, 16 and 19 October 2025, another four allegations were recorded, three of which were also for assault of children under 18, again linked to UNICEF-related projects.

I mean yes, these individuals are not UN staff; they are personnel of implementing partners. But the question is unavoidableis the UN exercising due diligence over the entities it entrusts with its mandate? 

Does the UN engage implementing partners to improve conditions for children, or are these partnerships,  through negligence or indifference, creating new avenues for their abuse?


In 2025 so far, there have been 41 allegations of rape, of which 37 involved children under 18. These were linked to projects implemented for:

  • UNICEF (14)
  • WFP (13)
  • WHO (4)
  • UNOPS (4)
  • UNHCR (3)
  • OCHA (1)

In 2024, children under 18 accounted for at least 28% of all SEA allegations and that figure is conservative, given that an additional 24% of victims were listed as “age unknown.” 

Rape constituted 12% of total allegations that year.

Then there is the category of peacekeeping and special political missions, where rape of children is clearly systemic. It is easier to avert one’s gaze,  but perhaps this is precisely where scrutiny must intensify.

And here I am also analyzing numbers. This is the trap inherent in quantitative reporting: patterns and ratios take over, and the individual victims disappear. Behind each statistic is a life: a child with a name, a family, a history, a future now fractured.

Who explains to a 10-year-old boy that he will be alright after being raped? Who provides care and schooling for a child born of sexual exploitation? Who treats the psychological, physical, and social scars inflicted by those who arrived under the blue flag claiming protection?

Why are we still here? Why are we reading these findings while maintaining the fiction that the UN enforces a zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse? Each year we hear the same prescriptions: more funding, more training, more risk-mapping, more awareness. Yet the same patterns recur.

The Secretary-General’s report to the General Assembly is extensive and data-heavy, but this is precisely the problem: its architecture buries the actual crisis under layers of metrics and operational jargon. And there, almost unnoticed in the middle of the document, sits the real revelation:


In 2024, 64,585 United Nations staff members responded to the annual perception survey on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse. Of those, 3.65% (2,360 people) stated that it was acceptable to pay for sex, and close to 1% (555) indicated that it was acceptable to engage in sexual activity with a child,  with one-third of those respondents occupying supervisory roles.

This alone reveals how embedded and normalized the culture of sexual exploitation and abuse has become within the UN and this does not even account for uniformed personnel, national police contingents, or military forces contributed by Member States to peacekeeping missions.

So why is the situation not improving and in several respects deteriorating? Policies are revised, bulletins updated, special coordination units created,  but the real deficit lies in accountability, and not only accountability for the direct perpetrator.

And what about the perpetrators who are shielded rather than sanctioned? What about the cases quietly buried because they involve personnel with the right connections or the right nationality? What about internal directives to “avoid reputational exposure” that override the rights of victims? 

The UN pursues low-level offenders as symbolic sacrifices while preserving the machinery that protects enablers, decision-makers, and silent bystanders. The Organization reports terminations as proof of resolve, yet accountability is never directed at those within HR, Legal, Ethics, or senior management who intervened to suppress complaints, stall proceedings, or intimidate victims. That is where the deeper accountability lies, and that is precisely where none is exercised.

Why is there no scrutiny of the senior officials who instruct HR and Legal to make cases “go away”? What about the victims who never report, either out of fear or because the system has taught them that nothing will happen? What about the managers whose first instinct is to protect their own reporting profile before the Security Council or the General Assembly? And what of the Legal and HR officers who invoke “insufficient evidence” as a procedural shield as though the absence of formal proof were not itself often the product of investigative indifference or institutional suppression?

The Secretary-General’s own report acknowledges that since 2006, approximately 750 paternity and child support claims arising from UN peace operations have been recorded with over 500 still unresolved. Most Member States have failed to take any meaningful steps toward resolution. Meanwhile, the children born of these abuses, many now approaching adulthood,  remain without schooling, without healthcare, without legal recognition, and trapped in lifelong stigma. They live in conditions of uncertainty and marginalization,  the direct human legacy of UN negligence.

Protracted investigation and disciplinary timelines are cited as “systemic challenges,” but they function as structural impediments to justice. Delays in inquiry, opaque handling of outcomes, and the absence of visible consequences reinforce a culture of impunity and corrode the Organization’s credibility. Even now, there remains no real accountability for those in leadership who failed in their obligation to act. The burden falls only on the isolated offender,  never on those who enabled, ignored, or suppressed the cases.

Alarmingly, in 2024, the internal survey itself recorded a stark indicator of institutional distrust: 6% of UN respondents,roughly 3,700 staff expressed no confidence in leadership’s ability to address sexual exploitation and abuse, up from 3% the previous year.The doubling reflects a measurable deterioration in trust in leadership.

The reality we must confront is this: a child in Bangui may flee from what he perceives as the threat (the militia or armed group) and run instead toward the UN blue helmets, whom he believes to be protectors. But the risk now is that he runs straight into the arms of his abuser. The UN’s personnel (civilian and military) leverage the UN’s image as a guardian and savior to secure access to vulnerable populations. They weaponize the very trust invested in the UN.

This is what makes the situation intolerable: the UN is not a bystander to these violations but the mechanism through which access to victims is enabled. When trust itself becomes the instrument of abuse, the UN mission has already failed at its fundamental duty: protection

Your Boss Comments on Your Booty But the UNDT Rules it’s Just a Deadlift Adjustment.

This week, the United Nations Dispute Tribunal issued a baffling judgment to say the very least, Novo v. Secretary-General, UNDT/2025/098 (26 November 2025),  in which it rescinded the decision of termination for a former UNICEF staff member who was charged with serious misconduct for sexual harassment (and unauthorized activities).

This judgment raises serious concerns about the UNDT’s understanding of power dynamics in the workplace and about the extent to which such rulings will discourage future reporting of sexual harassment in the UN.

The judgment itself is 71 pages long and refers to detailed witness examination, cross-examination, and OIOS interview transcripts. Despite sexually harassing three female staff/consultants (all of whom filed complaints) and despite corroborating witnesses, the judge chose to believe the supervisor’s version, using a copy-paste approach to dismiss all allegations of sexual harassment, save for the unauthorized outside activities.

The Tribunal established that in one incident the staff member approached the female supervisee at a gym while she was engaged in routine physical exercise and made remarks in Bosnian implying that she was instructed by her husband to work on her “booty” using colloquial language. The perpetrator explained that he was observing her form because he noticed some technical issues during her deadlift, and he mentioned that her husband might have advised her on her technique to make her booty bigger.

In weighing whether this constituted sexual harassment by a supervisor, the judgment unbelievably reads:

“The question before this Tribunal is whether the Applicant’s behavior, unprofessional staring at V03’s posterior and the statement about her husband’s instructions, constitutes harassment or sexual harassment. In the Tribunal’s view, the Applicant’s conduct must be evaluated in context. The act of staring appears to be a pattern of habitual, subconscious observation rather than any sexual gesture or act.”

The judge went on to justify the comments by stating that the act of staring at her booty might have been:

“reflecting an awkward attempt at social interaction rather than misconduct”

And:

“the Tribunal acknowledges V03’s feelings of discomfort but considers that the subjective offence alone does not establish harassment or sexual harassment; particularly when there is no objective evidence that the behavior was sexual or intimidating. Indeed, the Tribunal considers that, once more, the Applicant displayed unprofessional and intrusive behavior, but not one of a sexual nature.”

So for all UN staff exercising at the gym, the next time your supervisor stares directly at your backside while deadlifting and comments on your “booty” don’t get uncomfortable, because according to the UNDT, it’s just social interaction… with your backside..

In another disturbing episode, the supervisor gave a different staff member (a superviosee also) a copy of the book: “Sex and Lies: True stories of women’s intimate lives in the Arab world” by Leila Slimani claiming it was “relevant to her work.”

The book is about the sexual experiences of women in Morocco and the Arab world. And as The Guardian described it, Slimani “returns to north Africa to explore sex, pornography and hypocrisy.”

The supervisee testified that her work had nothing whatsoever to do with sexual narratives, Arab women’s intimate experiences, or Morocco. She explained that she did not challenge her supervisor at the time due to power dynamics being at the lowest rank, dependent on him for contract renewal and fearing that complaints would go unaddressed in the isolated Bihać duty station.

The judge correctly established the facts but once again dismissed the allegation, filtering it through his own selective perception of harassment. According to the judge, even though the supervisee found the gift deeply inappropriate, he adopted the supervisor’s absurd justification that the gift was an act of “educational sharing,” potentially useful to humanitarian work:

“whether the book is professionally relevant can be subjective, and in some humanitarian contexts materials concerning women’s intimate experiences or trafficking may bear on protection, gender-based violence, or cultural understanding relevant to child protection work.”

The judge then criticized the supervisee’s internal reaction by stating:

“V02’s assessment of the book’s inappropriateness was based on her perception of the contents of the book, which, in turn, was based on her interpretation of the title, back cover, and online summaries.”

And dismissed the claim by concluding:

“gifting of the book does not meet the objective threshold for harassment or sexual harassment. There is no evidence of sexual intent, no pattern of sexualized conduct tied to the gifting, and no demonstration that the act interfered with VO2’s work or created a hostile work environment.”

So, if your supervisor hands you a book titled “Sex and Lies” you are apparently expected to ignore the “Sex” part, trust his enlightened intellectual intentions, and focus on theoretical cultural anthropology. After all, if the UNDT judge can turn a blind eye, so can you.

Then, in three separate incidents involving two supervisees, the staff member commented to one woman that she preferred “strong muscular men” asked another, while walking behind her:

“How tall are you? You have a very nice height for a woman”,

and later at a bar in Bihać, leaned too close to her, invading her personal space, asking if she would like to “ride in an expensive car if driven by a handsome man, and telling her she was the type of woman used to men doing favors for her”.

And in all three incidents, the judge dismissed the allegations.

On the comment about interest in muscular men, the judge reasoned:

“the remark was a casual, somewhat awkward comment about V03’s personal preferences. The fact that V03 felt uncomfortable is acknowledged and is relevant. However, subjective discomfort alone does not establish harassment or sexual harassment.”

So next time your supervisor randomly offers his unsolicited psychoanalysis of your taste in male body types, maybe you should reply, “Thank you for your professional assessment.” Because apparently, commentary on your intimate personal preferences is part of your job.

And when your supervisor asks about your height and compliments you on it, while following behind you, do not mistake it for predatory interest. The UNDT judge insists:

“comment is addressed to physical stature only, and occurred in a social, informal context involving several colleagues”…

“unwelcome and unwise conduct … falls short of proving the requisite objective severity or sexual character.”

The extent to which this judge fails to grasp the nuances of sexual harassment as experienced by women is staggering. For the vast majority of women, sexual harassment is not confined to physical contact. It is anything that intrudes upon their bodily autonomy and personal dignity: the invasive stare, the unsolicited comment about one’s curves or “booty,” the remark about one’s taste in men, the book handed with a knowing smirk that centers sexuality as its theme. This is precisely how predators operate, not with overt groping, but through a steady drip of boundary violations and insinuations.

Why should my supervisor be commenting on my physical appearance?
Why should he be giving me a book titled “Sex and Lies”, a book which The Guardian characterized as “exploring sex, pornography and hypocrisy”?
Why should he be asking me if I prefer “strong muscular men”?
Why is he leaning in, crowding my space, speaking low and close, as if intimacy is assumed?

And the fundamental question:


Why is any of this taking place inside a UN workplace that claims to champion dignity, equality, and respect?

Many men in the UN derive perverse satisfaction from making women uncomfortable. They thrive on the microaggressions, the innuendos, the baiting comments that hover just below the disciplinary threshold. They get away with it precisely because of the ambiguity,  the plausible deniability. And now, emboldened by judgments like this, they will feel even safer doing so.

These men indulge in a quiet vocation: testing how far they can intrude into the bodies, space, and psyche of the women they supervise knowing full well the power imbalance protects them. And instead of confronting this pattern, too many judges prefer to dissect each incident into sterile fragments, stripping away the lived experience of women and repackaging predatory behavior as “awkward social interaction” or “habitual staring.”

Well, here is the reality:


We are not concerned with whether he meant it sexually, poetically, or subconsciously.


We are concerned with whether a professional environment exists where women can work without being sexualized, analyzed, or targeted.

Women do not join the UN hoping their supervisor will inquire about their body shape or sexual preferences. They join believing that equality and respect are more than decorative slogans painted onto banners and mission statements.

But clearly, in the eyes of this UNDT judgment, it is all just “much ado about nothing.”

This reasoning also stands in direct contradiction with binding jurisprudence of the UN internal justice system itself. In Hallal UNDT/2011/046, para. 55, later affirmed by UNAT 2012-UNAT-207,  the Tribunal held:

“in sexual harassment cases, credible oral victim testimony alone may be fully sufficient to support a finding of serious misconduct, without further corroboration being required”

And UNAT confirmed:

“The Dispute Tribunal did not err in law in giving full evidentiary weight to the complainant’s oral testimony absent documentary corroboration.”

The jurisprudence affirms that victim testimony is legally probative and sufficient to ground a finding of misconduct. By dismissing these women’s testimony because it did not include “objective evidence,” the judge was defying settled jurisprudence. A legal standard already affirmed at the appellate level.

This inconsistency between jurisprudential requirement and judicial practice demands scrutiny. For while the Tribunal applies an intent-based threshold in this case, the Organization simultaneously asserts a trauma-aware, victim-centred approach in its reporting to the GA.  The UN itself reports to the General Assembly the following passage in the Secretary-General’s report (Report of the Secretary-General, “Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse,” A/79/789, 17 February 2025, para. 5).:

“For example, when the nine judges of the United Nations Dispute
Tribunal visited the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in June 2024 as part of their induction into the United Nations administration of justice system, they were informed about measures in place to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse and had the opportunity to hear from the Special Coordinator
and the Victims’ Rights Advocate. The aim was to provide the judges with first-hand insights into the complexities and challenges associated with delivering protection from sexual exploitation and abuse on the ground, including the commitment to a
victim-centred approach. The Special Coordinator and the Victims’ Rights Advocate also raised concerns about the impact, especially on victims, of the protracted administrative and judicial decision-making.

Following the mission, the judges’reflections informed discussions and recommendations at the Third Meeting of Investigatory Bodies on Protection from Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment
convened jointly by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the United Nations Evaluation Group in June 2024. The Special Coordinator and the Victims’ Rights Advocate are planning to conduct similar information sessions with the judges of the
United Nations Appeals Tribunal during a mission to the Central African Republic scheduled to take place in early 2025.”

This is a formal declaration to Member States that the UNDT judges have been exposed to and educated on the lived realities of sexual exploitation and abuse, particularly the effects on victims. The UN uses this text to demonstrate compliance with a “victim-centred approach” implying that judicial interpretation would be informed by awareness of trauma, power asymmetry, and vulnerability.

Yet in this UNICEF judgment, the judicial reasoning shows no application of that mandate. The judge did not adopt a victim-centered evidentiary lens. Instead, he treated the testimony of three women as insufficient because it lacked “objective” proof  directly contradicting the Hallal standard, which recognizes that in sexual harassment cases, victim testimony can stand alone as probative evidence.

This illustrates a striking contradiction: before the GA, the UN asserts that judges have undergone sensitization on victim impact and reporting challenges. But in practice, the judge reverted to assessing the accused’s conduct through the lens of innocuous intent rather than evaluating its effect on the women. The “victim-centred approach” praised in GA reporting collapses under judicial reasoning that effectively places the burden of proof on victims to demonstrate not only harassment, but the perpetrator’s internal sexual intent.

What the UN presents to Member States as advancement in judicial awareness and responsiveness does not translate into adjudication. The legal framework that the UN claims to be strengthening remains selectively applied and when tested in real cases, defaults back to minimizing, reframing, and dismissing victim testimony.

A justice system that demands victims prove the psychology of their harasser is not victim-centred it is perpetrator-shielding.

And to all the women out there, I say: keep deadlifting.

Western Staff Get Zoom Links. Palestinian Staff Get Termination Letters.

Mrakic and Lazzarini: A Case Study in How Power Turns Against Palestinians

“It is in the nature of power that it can also lead to abuse.”  Immanuel Kant

Few embody Kant’s warning about the corruption of power more clearly than UNDP’s Alessandro Mrakic and the UNRWA Commissioner-General, Philippe Lazzarini whose decisions reveal exactly what happens when authority loses its moral anchor. When they take office, they always start the same way: soft, conciliatory, overly courteous. They walk through the corridors performing friendliness, offering as-salāmu ʿalaykumahlan wa sahlankulshi tamam? and other canned Arabic pleasantries to appear connected to Palestinians. They charm, they placate, they pretend to “understand the context.” Then comes the classic sequence: charm the staff union, send them to missions and DSA to buy loyalty, promote a few managers to guarantee obedience, and before long, they have secured full control of the entire structure.

And once they feel fully in control, once they believe they are untouchable, that is exactly when the abuse begins. Leaders appointed to serve Palestinian staff lose their sense of reality, responsibility, and basic humanity. They stop seeing the destruction, the fear, the displacement, the daily humiliation Palestinians endure. They stop seeing Palestinians as people with rights, families, trauma, and obligations and start seeing them as obstacles to managerial convenience. Power blinds them, and in their blindness, they act with a level of arrogance that would be unthinkable in any other context.

How else can anyone explain the actions of UNDP Gaza Office Head Alessandro Mrakic? A man with no background in people management decides he can dispose of people like paperwork. He gives direct orders to terminate the contracts of two long-serving Palestinian women ( UNDP Gaza Office staff), one with more than 25 years of service by instructing HR to send an email quoting a clause about contract expiry.

“A temporary or FTA shall expire automatically and without prior notice on the expiration date specified in the letter of appointment.”

How does he even dare to use an “expiry” provision in this context? Do Palestinian staff “expire” because they fled bombardment? Because they fled the horror of death and genocide? Do years of service, loyalty, and survival simply evaporate under Mrakic’s administrative convenience?

Mrakic further threatened that their contracts would end on 31 December 2025 if they did not return immediately to Gaza. This, while Israel has categorically barred all Palestinian UN staff who fled Gaza from returning  under any circumstances.

At the same time, Mrakic found it perfectly acceptable to pull USD 400,000 from the UNDP Crisis Bureau funds to hire more than 13 international staff  three of them Italian, mirroring Mrakic’s own nationality.

Kant warned that power bends toward abuse the moment it is left unchecked. Mrakic is the textbook illustration: rewarding his own network, expanding his own circle, fortifying his own comfort, all while Palestinian staff are punished for fleeing death. Power, once concentrated, turns inward and corrupts. Instead of safeguarding Palestinian staff under bombardment, Mrakic invests in building a protective wall of internationals around himself. Resources flow upward to the privileged, the safe, the Western European, while the Palestinian staff of Gaza pay the price for surviving a war.

It is indeed in the nature of power that it can also lead to abuse. And the abuse becomes so entrenched that officials no longer see the human cost of their decisions  nor the consequences for Palestinian lives and livelihoods.
They stop recognising that each email they sign off on destroys a Palestinian family’s income, pushes Palestinian women further into precarity, or strips long-serving staff of their dignity. What should be moral decisions become administrative reflexes and the suffering becomes invisible to them, because they no longer look for it.

Take Philippe Lazzarini, proudly tweeting a few weeks ago:

“With the ceasefire in place, UNRWA is stepping up its back-to-learning programme both in person and online.”

This, while Lazarrini personally decided to withhold the salaries of more than 600 UNRWA teachers over 400 of them women  because they fled Gaza under bombardment. These same teachers continued teaching remotely and they are fully eligible for teaching the online learning programme he tweets so proudly about.

And all of this, while Lazzarini himself works remotely from Geneva, fully benefiting from Alternate Working Modalities (AWM), a policy designed, inter alia , to protect staff during war, insecurity, and displacement. Lazzarini enjoys every safeguard, every exemption, every layer of protection the system offers, while denying those same protections to the Palestinian women and men who kept UNRWA’s education system alive under airstrikes. He promotes online learning publicly, yet refuses to grant the Palestinian staff delivering it access to Alternate Working Modalities (AWM) a UN-wide entitlement available to all staff, specifically created for circumstances exactly like Gaza.

Every international staff member from Gaza and the West Bank has been relocated, placed on AWM, and is now working from the comfort of their own homes, laptops open, coffee mugs beside them, fluffy cushions behind their backs. Meanwhile, Palestinian UNRWA teachers are struggling to survive in Egypt, living in uncertainty, displacement and financial precarity, and still denied the same right.

Lazzarini writes glowing op-eds in The Guardian about UNRWA’s “capacity, expertise and community trust,” praising Palestinian teachers, doctors and engineers as the backbone of public service delivery. This public rhetoric earns him credibility with donors and applause in international forums yet no one bothers to ask how he treats his own Palestinian teachers, doctors and engineers behind closed doors.

What has he done to honour the more than 550 UNRWA staff killed by Israel?
Why is he withholding the compensation their families are owed; compensation that is the bare minimum gesture of recognition for the staff who died delivering the very services he advertises in his speeches?

No one asks, because no one is interested in Palestinians.

No one asks because no one is interested in Palestinian lives, deaths, or the injustice that follows them into every system, including the UN’s. 

The ugly truth is Palestinian suffering does not trend. It does not attract donor pledges. It does not move the powerful. It is tolerated, rationalised, or quietly swept aside. Mrakic and Lazzarini, like hundreds of other senior UN officials are invested in realpolitik, in optics, and survival of their own positions.  Principles and moral courage do not feature anywhere in their decision-making.

Who will hold such officials accountable?

Kant warned that the moment power becomes enjoyable, judgment collapses. The pleasure of authority blinds reason, distorts duty, and turns leadership into self-preservation. Nothing corrupts faster than the comfort of power and nothing weakens moral clarity more than believing you are untouchable. When officials start enjoying their position instead of exercising it responsibly, conscience fades, principles dissolve, and the people they were meant to serve become collateral damage.

It is indeed in the nature of power that it can lead to abuse. But abuse is not inevitable. Even now, you can choose differently, if you dare look at what you have already done. Look inward, not outward.

This is a decisive moment, the moment you chose to turn your back on your own Palestinian staff. The people who kept this organization standing in the worst conditions imaginable. The people you were appointed to protect, not discard.

In truth, power didn’t corrupt you:  you bent it and weaponised it to serve yourselves, and left your Palestinian staff to pay the price.

Is Brazil Quietly Consolidating Control Over the ISA’s Justice System?

Today, the United Nations General Assembly is set to take a decision that will have profound implications for the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and for the integrity of the UN’s internal justice system. The Assembly will vote on the appointment of new judges to the UN Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) and the UN Appeals Tribunal (UNAT), and among the nominees recommended for appointment are two Brazilian nationals, one to each court, at the very moment when the ISA, led by a Brazilian Secretary-General, Leticia Carvalho is the subject of urgent legal challenges and procedural failures that have already alarmed observers across the system.

This convergence is a configuration that could potentially influence, concentrate, or even consolidate control over every judicial stage through which ISA administrative actions must pass. Under ISA’s statute, staff members challenge administrative decisions internally before the Joint Appeals Board (JAB). JAB’s decisions, including suspension of action requests, merits review, and recommendations, are then appealed directly to UNAT, which serves as the final and only external judicial instance for ISA matters. There is no UN Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) stage for ISA. The judicial chain is therefore short, fragile, and highly exposed to influence.

These bodies must be independent of each other, institutionally distinct, and free from any perception of national or executive influence. Yet today’s vote is taking place while the ISA’s internal justice system is still recovering from a complete shutdown triggered by the Secretary-General’s earliest decisions, and while new judges, of the same nationality as the Secretary-General (Brazil) are being nominated to the very tribunals that form the appellate pathway for ISA staff.

The vote occurring today has the potential to place a judge of the same nationality as the respondent organization’s executive head in the seat of final judicial authority over that organization. In the midst of the most serious governance crisis the ISA has ever faced, this creates an unavoidable institutional question: Who ultimately controls access to justice at the ISA?

Before her election, in July 2024, Letícia Reis de Carvalho wrapped her candidacy in the rhetoric of transparency and virtue, presenting herself as the reformer who would cleanse the ISA of the opacity she insinuated had plagued it for years:

“For me, the mission of the ISA and the leadership of the ISA is to be a trustee — an honest broker… It should offer transparency of its own procedures… If you are a trustee of the biggest commons on Earth, you cannot be called obscure or opaque in any way. We absolutely need practices that can turn things from opaqueness to transparency.” excerpt from an interview on 4 July 2024

Those promises collapsed almost immediately upon her assumption of office on 1 January 2025.

Within her first forty-eight hours, six staff members ( P-3s, P-4s, a D-1 Chief of Staff, and a D-2) the majority who had signed valid fixed-term contracts in December 2024 and had already entered on duty, received abrupt notifications informing them that ISA would be “unable to complete the onboarding process,” while two others saw their contracts suddenly terminated under the guise of restructuring. Under settled UN administrative law, acceptance of an offer followed by entry on duty completes the appointment. It cannot be undone unilaterally. UNAT has repeatedly held that such withdrawals are unlawful, constitute an abuse of authority, and violate Article 101 of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, these staff members were removed from their posts without reason, due process, or remedy.

As the staff filed urgent motions with the JAB, seeking immediate review of these abrupt decisions, the crisis escalated further. The Secretary-General dismantled the entire JAB structure within days of the motions being submitted. The tribunal ceased to function by 7 January 2025, leaving staff with no internal mechanism and no access to justice during the precise moment in which they needed it. 

When UNAT later reviewed this situation, it expressly noted Order No. 2024-591, 

“concern that the JAB was dismantled temporarily without prior warning given to ISA staff members and with no reasons provided by the Administration,” observed that this had “denying the staff members access to justice in the interim,” and concluded that “the temporary void rendered meaningless the JAB suspension of action mechanism.”

After dismantling the JAB, the ISA simultaneously moved ahead with recruitment to fill the very posts it had unlawfully vacated, thereby obstructing the possibility of reinstatement before the internal justice process had even begun.

Five weeks later, the Secretary-General appointed a new chair of the reconstituted JAB: Martha Halfeld, a former UNAT judge and, crucially, another Brazilian national. This appointment placed a compatriot with appellate-level judicial experience at the head of the very tribunal responsible for reviewing challenges to her own administrative decisions, raising profound concerns about the structural independence of ISA’s internal justice mechanism.

These concerns deepened when, in a separate motion filed by the dismissed D-1 Chief of Staff, UNAT Order No. 2024-592 (Bourrel) revealed that ISA had instructed a private security company to disable her home alarm system in Jamaica while she and her daughter were still residing there. Her sworn affidavit states that this action was intended to intimidate and cause distress, a clear breach of duty of care.

And now we return to today’s vote: a decision that will determine who sits on the UNDT and ultimately who hears appeals at UNAT.

The ISA Secretary-General is Brazilian.

The newly appointed JAB Chair is Brazilian and former UNAT judge.

One recommended UNDT judge is Brazilian.

One recommended UNAT judge is Brazilian.

The question is not whether the nominees are qualified; they are. The question is whether any justice system can afford a configuration in which the respondent (ISA), the internal reviewer (JAB chair), and both appellate judicial authorities (UNDT and UNAT judges) may all be led by nationals of the same Member State at the exact moment that the legality of ISA’s actions is under scrutiny.

The UN’s internal justice system has always held that justice must not only be done; it must be seen to be done. Today’s vote tests that principle. It raises unavoidable questions about recusal, structural safeguards, and the preservation of judicial independence.

How can ISA staff, who have already experienced the erasure of their internal tribunal, trust a system in which each stage of review now appears tethered, directly or indirectly, to a single national nexus?

What assurances will be provided that Brazilian judges will recuse themselves from ISA-related cases?

And what message does this send to the entire UN workforce about the stability, independence, and integrity of the justice system designed to protect them?

And now, as today’s vote proceeds, the configuration becomes even more difficult to ignore. Brazil has nominated one judge to the UNDT and one judge to the UNAT in the same electoral cycle; a former UNAT judge has already been installed as Chair of the ISA’s JAB; the ISA Secretary-General is Brazilian; and, adding an additional layer, one of the current members of the UN Board of Auditors and UN Panel of External Auditors ( Mr. Vital de Rêgo Filho, President of the Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts) is also Brazilian, entrusted with overseeing the financial integrity of UN entities, including the ISA.

When the respondent, the internal reviewer, the external auditor, and the proposed appellate judges all converge around a single Member State at the precise moment when the ISA’s governance is under judicial scrutiny, the question becomes unavoidable:

Is Brazil positioning itself to control the ISA’s system of justice and its fiduciary oversight, deliberately or by design? or is the UN system sleepwalking into a concentration of influence it has not yet fully understood?

How the UN Fought a Paralyzed Staff Member in Administrative Litigation

There are cases that reveal, far more than any policy document or SG speech, what the UN truly is when stripped of its rhetoric. Two recent UNDT Orders  Order No. 80 (GVA/2025) and Order No. 110 (GVA/2025), do exactly that. 

In May 2021, a long-serving UNEP staff member suffered a severe medical event that left her unable to speak, move, or respond. She became fully dependent on medical technology and constant clinical supervision: tracheostomy management, airway care, rapid-response for oxygen desaturation, seizure monitoring, and PEG-related interventions. For four years, her survival has required the presence of trained intensive-care nurses, operating in a home-based environment that replicates the core functions of a monitored clinical setting.

Her daughter, placed in the position of legal representative, continued coordinating her mother’s care while navigating the UN Worldwide Medical Plan (UNWWP), annual medical reporting, and the system of exceptional reimbursements that had been approved year after year. The UN had accepted, without dispute, that her mother’s condition required uninterrupted 24/7 medical care and multiple therapies exceeding standard plan limits.

The arrangement held. Until it didn’t.

On 24 June 2025, everything shifted. Cigna, the UN Health Insurance Provider, in coordination with the UN Health and Life Insurance Section (HLIS) and the UN Division of Healthcare Management and Occupational Safety and Health (DHMOSH), jointly informed the daughter that, as of 1 July, the services her mother had relied on for four years, services previously acknowledged as clinically essential, would no longer be covered. The reason: these services were now considered “custodial care,” a category excluded by the UN plan.

It was a decisive administrative shift delivered at the precise point where the mother’s ability to survive depended on continuity.

Shocked by the decision, the daughter, who is not a UN staff or a UN expert, sought management evaluation on 27 June and immediately filed an application for suspension of action. Her position was straightforward: withdrawing life-preserving medical care with almost no notice would have direct consequences that could not be reversed. She supported her application with medical reports, Cigna’s own written confirmation that the care constituted “medical services,” and clinical certificates describing the risks of interruption.

When the UN Dispute Tribunal examined the file, the judge noted that the decision “changed the status quo,” that the Organisation had provided no evidence supporting the reclassification, and that the Administration had not disclosed the independent medical report it claimed to rely upon. The daughter, in contrast, had substantiated every aspect of her claim.

The Tribunal appeared ready to assess the lawfulness of the decision. And at that point, the Organisation altered its position.

Before the Tribunal could rule on the suspension, the Administration granted a temporary extension of the 24/7 medical care until 30 September 2025.
With the implementation postponed, the application became moot, and the Tribunal dismissed it.

It is important to note that from the very beginning, the Administration did not limit itself to defending the medical reclassification. It immediately resorted to a stunningly aggressive tactic, attempting to block the daughter’s request on receivability grounds and arguing that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction even to hear the suspension application. In other words, instead of addressing the substance, the UN attempted to stop the case from being heard at all. This astonishing procedural maneuver illustrates the Organisation’s reflex: when confronted with a life-or-death situation affecting a former staff member, its first instinct was to litigate the technicalities of admissibility rather than engage with the urgent medical emergency at hand.

This sequence repeated itself three months later.

As the September deadline approached, the daughter filed a second suspension application on 16 September. The Administration replied by informing the Tribunal that coverage would again be extended, this time until 31 December 2025. The management evaluation was closed one day after the application was filed, rendering the matter no longer receivable.

Once again, the Tribunal could not examine the substance.

In both orders, Judge Sun implicitly warned what was happening:

The Administration was deliberately prolonging the review, granting just-enough extensions to “avoid judicial scrutiny” (words used by the Applicant, and clearly not contradicted by the Tribunal), while forcing the daughter to re-litigate every 90 days to prevent the Organization from withdrawing life-sustaining care.

The judge went so far as to remind the Administration of its “duty of care” and to urge it to stop this cycle of threats, delays, and last-minute extensions. That is as close as the Tribunal comes to reprimand outside a judgment on the merits. The judge declined to rule on the merits. But he added something rarely said in these orders. He formally reminded the UN of its duty of care:

“In view of the seriousness of the matter, the Tribunal highlights the Administration’s duty of care towards its staff members, and strongly encourages it to expedite the resolution… to avoid the need for another application.”
(Order No. 110, para. 18) 

These orders are important because they expose a system where:

  • Duty of care becomes optional.
  • Medical vulnerability becomes a legal opportunity: a chance to reduce costs under the cover of “interpretation.”
  • Staff are protected only as long as they can fight.
  • Family members become de facto litigants, expected to know insurance law, administrative law, medical guidelines, and UN internal procedures at the very moment their lives are collapsing.
  • A procedural pattern where the UN uses short-term extensions as a shield, avoiding having to justify its actions before a judge.
  • The legality of the core decision remains unexamined because each extension resets the clock.
  • A judicial record quietly flags the implications, without venturing beyond the limits of the suspension-of-action mechanism.

The case illustrates how administrative decisions can shift the ground beneath individuals who are least able to absorb disruption, and how the internal justice framework, when confined to procedural thresholds, can be prevented from addressing the underlying issue.

A former staff member with catastrophic injuries should not be engaged in legal proceedings  directly or through her daughter, just to preserve life-sustaining care. The language of the Orders shows a judge repeatedly constrained by the procedural rules of suspension applications, unable to reach the core issue because the Organisation shifts position just in time.

The facts speak clearly: confronted with a former staff member whose survival depends on uninterrupted medical care, the UN showed remarkable speed and determination in defending its administrative position, yet an equally remarkable unwillingness to honour the core obligation it owes its personnel: a duty of care that, in this case, was treated as expendable.

UNStaff4Gaza: Memorial Before Justice

On 23 October, UN Staff 4 Gaza issued a press release announcing the launch of a memorial project for UN personnel killed by Israel in Gaza. The group is led by former senior UN staff, many of whom I have worked with.

Before getting into what is fundamentally wrong, on multiple levels, with this action and with this press release, I want to acknowledge what is positive.
It is the first time a public statement explicitly uses the word killed and names the perpetrator, Israel :

“More than 370 members of UN personnel have been confirmed killed by the Israel Defense Forces since October 2023.”


Most others still refer to these colleagues as “dead,” carefully omitting the party responsible. That UN Staff 4 Gaza names Israel directly is due in large part to the fact that its leaders are former senior UN officials; otherwise, they would have been dismissed immediately by the organization. Still, they deserve credit for calling things by their name. The release also correctly states that the majority of those killed were UNRWA staff, not general “UN staff,” a distinction long overdue.

It is precisely because its leaders are former UN staff that they have space for more forceful action and bolder language, unless this entire exercise is simply a PR moment, a gateway to a few interviews on Al Jazeera or other international media, followed by silence.

A memorial has symbolic value, but it falls painfully short of what UNRWA staff killed in Gaza actually deserved. Given the positions and titles these former officials once held, they can do far more. If they genuinely seek to honour UNRWA staff, they can begin by addressing the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, Philippe Lazzarini, and demand to know why the families of the UNRWA staff killed in Gaza continue to be denied their entitlements.

I doubt the staff who were killed were wondering about a future memorial. Their concerns were very different: If I die, who will take care of my children? Who will support my spouse, my parents? Who will ensure my children have access to education, medicine, stability? That they have enough funds if they choose to escape this hell voluntarily?


No one lies awake at night hoping that their children will one day visit a monument with their name etched on it. They hope their children will survive and be protected.

Many will interpret this as diminishing the efforts of UN Staff 4 Gaza. It is not. I respect most of them, and I know several personally who carry the Palestinian cause with sincerity. This is precisely why their voices, reputations, and platforms matter, and why they should be used for something that will actually serve the families of the UNRWA staff killed by Israel in Gaza, many of whom were killed in the line of service.

There is another point that must be said plainly. If those killed had been American, British, German, Canadian, take your pick, there would already be dozens of committees, campaigns, and advocacy groups demanding justice, pushing relentlessly for reparations, lobbying governments, flooding the media. But when the victims are Palestinian, the system stops at pity. It never reaches action.


This is what a colonial hierarchy looks like: grief is permitted, justice is not.

A brief reminder: the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Philippe Lazzarini, gave the bereaved families USD 300 each instead of the USD 126,000 to which they are entitled. And no, the reason is not that UNRWA has a “different set of rules.” The management deliberately excluded the Gaza staff from the annual insurance coverage.

Another reminder: to this day, the Commissioner-General has not released the Provident Fund savings of the deceased staff. These savings belong to the staff and their families, not to the Agency. Nothing prevents UNRWA from releasing these funds or, at minimum, continuing to pay their salaries against their accumulated savings until compensation is properly processed.

If the goal is truly to honour the UNRWA staff killed by Israel in Gaza, then start with real work. 

A memorial is beautiful, but beauty does not feed children, does not pay school fees, does not treat trauma, does not bring stability. What will come next is predictable: the unveiling, the photo ops for senior officials, and another round of speeches, while the families still search for someone willing to raise their case and push it forward.

A memorial may stand in stone, but justice must stand in action. Right now, the former is moving ahead, and the latter is nowhere in sight.

The Legal Erosion of Due Process: How UNRWA’s Leadership Enabled Israel’s Narrative

A Critical Legal Analysis of UNRWA’s Commissioner-General’s Termination of Nine Gaza Staff Members

I. Introduction

When the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) was established in 1949, its founding resolution (302 [IV]) mandated an independent humanitarian function, insulated from political interference. The Commissioner-General, as the agency’s head, is bound by the same Charter obligations as all senior UN officials: to act exclusively in the interest of the United Nations, free from instructions from any government.

Yet in January 2024, that principle was dramatically breached.

Following unverified Israeli allegations that several UNRWA Gaza staff members participated in the 7 October 2023 attacks, Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini swiftly terminated nine Palestinian UNRWA staff without any evidence, due process, or hearings. 

By his own admission, the Commissioner-General fired the staff “in close consultation with the Secretary-General” and “in the interest of the Agency,” even as Israel provided no substantiating proof. His actions not only violated fundamental due-process rights under UNRWA’s internal regulatory framework but also handed Israel the rhetorical weapon it had long sought: official confirmation that UNRWA employed “Hamas operatives.” This rhetoric is, of course, devoid of any truth.

Within days, Israeli authorities restricted Lazzarini’s access to Gaza, and later shuttered the Agency’s East Jerusalem office. In effect, the Commissioner-General’s legally indefensible act furnished the pretext for UNRWA’s political dismantling.

This article examines, from a purely legal perspective, how these decisions contravened the UN’s internal justice principles, undermined the agency’s independence, and blurred the boundary between humanitarian neutrality and political appeasement.


II. The Legal Framework

1. Institutional Autonomy under the UN Charter

Article 100 of the UN Charter stipulates that international civil servants “shall not seek or receive instructions from any government.” The corresponding Staff Regulation 1.1 reinforces this duty of independence. The Commissioner-General of UNRWA, although appointed by the Secretary-General, exercises authority delegated by the General Assembly, not by Member States.

The Charter therefore precludes any de facto subordination of UNRWA to a State’s political or security agenda. The Commissioner-General’s legal allegiance is to the UN system’s administrative law and to the staff regulations that safeguard fairness, neutrality, and the rule of law within the Organization, notably Article 100 of the UN Charter and Staff Regulation 1.1(a), which explicitly prohibit any UN official from seeking or receiving instructions from a government.

2. Due Process under the UNRWA Staff Rules

UNRWA’s Staff Regulations and Rules mirror the UN Secretariat’s internal justice framework, anchored in:

  • Presumption of innocence: no disciplinary measure can be imposed without clear, credible evidence. 
  • Right to be heard: staff must be informed of charges and allowed to respond before sanctions are imposed. The UNRWA nine staff did not receive any charge letters setting out the allegations, and they were not afforded any opportunity to respond before being terminated.
  • Standard of proof: allegations must be established on the “balance of probabilities” at a minimum, or “beyond a reasonable doubt” for grave misconduct. In the case at hand, since the sanction concerned staff termination (serious misconduct), the correct threshold to be applied was beyond a reasonable doubt. No standard of proof was applied to the nine staff who were terminated.
  • Proportionality and reasoned decision: sanctions must correspond to proven misconduct, supported by a reasoned administrative decision.
  • Judicial oversight: staff possess the right to appeal before the UN Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) and, subsequently, the UN Appeals Tribunal (UNAT).

These guarantees embody the UN’s internal rule of law. They are not optional, even in crises.

3. Role of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

OIOS functions as the UN’s independent investigative arm. Its mandate is fact-finding, not adjudication. The final decision to impose discipline rests with the head of entity, here, the Commissioner-General, who must base that decision on verified, corroborated evidence. OIOS does not pronounce guilt; it simply reports findings.

Therefore, when OIOS states that “evidence, if authenticated and corroborated, could indicate involvement,” this signals that proof is incomplete, not that wrongdoing is established. Acting upon such an inconclusive report constitutes a fundamental procedural error.


III. Factual Chronology

1. January 2024: The Allegations

In January 2024, Israeli authorities transmitted to UNRWA a set of allegations claiming that 12 staff members in Gaza were involved in the 7 October attacks. No supporting evidence was shared. Nevertheless, Commissioner-General Lazzarini, in consultation with the Secretary-General, immediately terminated the contracts of the implicated staff “in the interest of the Agency.”

By doing so, he pre-empted both investigation and adjudication, effectively presuming guilt. The act bypassed all procedural steps mandated by the Staff Rules; notification of charges, opportunity to respond (OTR), due process, hearing in case of termination, and proportional review.

2. March–April 2024: Expansion of the Investigation

As further unverified allegations surfaced, additional staff were placed under OIOS investigation. The UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) later investigated a total of 19 UNRWA staff members after Israel provided information on an additional seven individuals in March and April 2024. 

The Commissioner-General maintained the summary terminations, justifying them as necessary to protect UNRWA’s reputation and reassure donors. Yet this justification itself contradicts the raison d’être of due process: protecting institutional integrity through law, not expediency.

3. 5 August 2024: The Commissioner-General’s Statement

Upon OIOS’s completion of its review, Commissioner-General Lazzarini issued a formal statement:

“In nine other cases, the evidence obtained by OIOS was insufficient to support the staff members’ involvement… For the remaining nine cases, the evidence – if authenticated and corroborated – could indicate involvement… I have decided… these remaining nine staff members cannot work for UNRWA. All contracts… will be terminated in the interest of the Agency.”

This language exposes the legal incoherence of the decision. “Could indicate” is a hypothetical, not a factual conclusion. Terminating staff on that basis amounts to administrative arbitrariness.

Moreover, Lazzarini acknowledged that Israel had not provided evidence despite repeated requests, yet proceeded regardless. The decision therefore lacked the essential element of facta probata (evidence proven).

The dismissals triggered a cascade of political repercussions: Israel restricted the Commissioner-General’s entry to Gaza, forced closure of UNRWA’s Jerusalem field office, and intensified its campaign to defund the Agency. Ironically, Lazzarini’s decision, intended to preserve UNRWA’s credibility, supplied Israel with the official validation it had long sought: that UNRWA employed Hamas affiliates.

5. 24 and 30 October 2025: The United Nations’ Spokesperson’s Clarification on the Record

More recently, during the 24 October 2025 noon briefing, the Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General stated:

“There were a small number of UNRWA staff members who were credibly linked to Hamas, and we have fired those personnel.”

On 30 October 2025, during the noon briefing, the UN Deputy Spokesperson had to retract and publicly correct this statement:

**Clarification

“I have a clarification to make.  In the noon briefing on Friday, 24 October, responding to a question about allegations against UNRWA personnel by the Israeli authorities, I said that “there were a small number of staff members of UNRWA who were credibly linked to Hamas and we have handled that situation and fired those personnel”.

This was incorrect.  The outcome of the OIOS [Office of Internal Oversight Services] investigation into these allegations did not qualify them as credible.  Instead, OIOS said that the evidence that it obtained — if authenticated and corroborated — might indicate that the staff members may have been involved.  The Government of Israel, to date, has not provided additional elements to corroborate or authenticate the claims, although it has been asked to do so repeatedly. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice last week ruled that the State of Israel’s claim that UNRWA is infiltrated by Hamas was not substantiated, nor were allegations that UNRWA is not a neutral organisation.”

This clarification is decisive. It formally admits that no credible evidence existed. The nine staff members were therefore dismissed unlawfully, in violation of both internal due-process guarantees and the principle of presumption of innocence.

IV. Key Legal Issues Emerging from the Record

  1. Absence of Evidentiary Basis
     The Commissioner-General’s reliance on speculative OIOS language (“if authenticated and corroborated”) fails the basic evidentiary threshold required for termination. Without authenticated proof, the decision is ultra vires, beyond his lawful authority. Further, in cases of serious misconduct where the contemplated disciplinary measure could be termination, the threshold of evidence required is beyond a reasonable doubt.
  2. Violation of Due Process
      By acting before investigation and denying staff the opportunity to respond, the Commissioner-General contravened the UN’s procedural guarantees under Chapter X of the UN rules on disciplinary process, as well as Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (right to a fair hearing).
  3. Subordination to a Member State’s Allegations
     The Commissioner-General’s actions reflected de facto compliance with Israeli political pressure, contrary to Article 100 of the Charter and Regulation 1.1 of the Staff Regulations prohibiting receipt of instructions from governments.
  4. Public Defamation and Reputational Harm
     His statements, and their immediate media amplification, effectively branded UNRWA staff as terrorists. Even absent evidence, the public perception of guilt caused irreparable reputational damage to the Agency and the individuals concerned.
  5. Institutional Accountability Vacuum
     Despite the subsequent UN clarification and ICJ ruling dismissing Israel’s claims, no remedial action, such as reinstatement or compensation, has been taken. The absence of corrective measures perpetuates impunity within the UN’s leadership structure.

From a legal standpoint, the only appropriate remedy would be the immediate reinstatement of the nine unlawfully dismissed staff, or at the very least, an accountability review into the Commissioner-General’s conduct to restore institutional integrity.

UNRWA Is Not Hamas.

It is a United Nations agency operating under the authority of the General Assembly, employing doctors, teachers, engineers, and social workers, all of them refugees themselves, who serve under UN rules of neutrality and oversight. The attempt to recast this humanitarian institution as a militant organization is a political Israeli fabrication, and the Commissioner-General’s unlawful dismissals gave that fiction an undeserved aura of legitimacy

Beyond the procedural irregularities, the broader consequence is reputational and structural: the very act intended to protect UNRWA from political attack became the instrument that enabled it.

The Commissioner-General’s actions have contributed to fuel the narrative of Israel about UNRWA staff linked to Hamas. Contrary to his statements, the CG failed to protect UNRWA from reputational risks. Quite the contrary, it was his acts that led to an irreparable reputational damage by linking, incorrectly and unlawfully and outside any regulatory framework, the dismissal of these staff to Hamas- a damage that may prove be very difficult to repair.