“Having a Baby in Africa Is Nothing”: The UN’s Moral Collapse

“I would not let the UN teach me morals. Having a baby in Africa is nothing. Where one has a baby, she wanted a baby. How many people have babies here? The UN does not understand that. The UN thinks that she has been victimized by the UN staff who came. No, it’s the opposite.”

This was the shocking statement of a MONUSCO international staff member to the UN tribunal after he was dismissed for sexual exploitation and abuse of a local woman in Goma.

Last week, the UNDT rendered a damning judgment UNDT/2025/089, Compaore v. Secretary-General, which evidences a systemic collapse of compliance with the principle of “do no harm” among UN international staff and highlights the widening gap between the Organisation’s proclaimed norms and its operational realities.

What the Tribunal recounts next reveals a level of predation that documents the institutional inability to give effect to every policy, every training, and every public assertion that the Organisation upholds the principle of ‘do no harm”. 

“The staff member met the local woman when she was selling vegetables on the roadside in Goma took her number and, within days, he was having regular sexual intercourse with her.

He knew that there was a notable status differential between him, an international United Nations staff member and the SEA survivor, a seller on the market in Goma.

The woman earned between USD 10 and USD 25 per month… she was also supporting her ten-year-old son. By contrast, the staff member’s net salary was approximately USD 14,000 per month.

He visited her at her house and started giving her significant sums of money up to half of her month’s earnings as well as promised to help opening her own business…

…when the victim informed him that she became pregnant as a result, he reacted angrily, and called her a ‘prostitute’ and ‘thief,’ telling her to leave his house.

He then took the local woman far to meet with a pharmacist that he knew, using a UN vehicle. At the location of the pharmacist, he asked her to do a pregnancy test, which was positive.

He then asked the pharmacist how they could arrange an abortion even though the local woman informed him that she did not want to abort. He then organized a meeting at a hotel in Goma, during which the pharmacist pressured the local woman to get an abortion; and he gave her US$ 400.00 (i.e. the equivalent of four months’ income or seven months’ rent for her) to financially incentivize her to get an abortion.

After giving her the money for an abortion, he filed a criminal complaint against her, accusing her of harassing him and of claiming money from him. In his complaint, he requested the police to verify if she was still pregnant, while being aware that abortion is a criminal offence in the DRC.

He then made the local woman sign an agreement in exchange of USD 8,000 payment. As part of this agreement, the local woman also signed a letter withdrawing allegations against him which were then pending in the local court.”

I mean if this is the outcome of years of UN training on “do no harm” then we are forced to confront the undeniable truth: something is not merely broken: something is rotten at the core. And perhaps the deeper tragedy is this: people have become so accustomed to this pattern of abuse that they have grown desensitized to it. These cases no longer shock; they are absorbed as routine background noise.

We must ask ourselves: who is reading these stories? Who is outraged? And why is this not shaking the Organisation to its foundations?

What is truly galling is that the international staff member stood before the Tribunal and insisted the relationship was consensual. The Tribunal, drawing on Makeen 2024-UNAT-1461, para. 52, citing Lucchini rejected this narrative entirely, establishing that in the face of glaring economic deprivation and an overwhelming power differential, genuine consent was impossible. Sex in such a situation is inherently coercive and any claimed consent collapses under legal and ethical scrutiny.

The Tribunal also held that the survivor’s “withdrawal of the complaints in domestic proceedings, following an $8,000 financial settlement,” does not absolve the perpetrator nor constrain the UN’s authority to act, since national acquittals do not extinguish administrative responsibility.

The staff member disputed the proportionality of his dismissal, arguing that a mere reprimand or censure would have sufficed. This position attempts to recast predatory conduct as a correctable misjudgment rather than misconduct of such severity that it renders continued employment untenable. It is a defence that collapses on its face when measured against the Organisation’s core obligations and basic standards of conduct.

The problem is just like the genocide in Palestine, people have become used to harm so much that these stories pass almost unremarkable. And the UN surely counts on this. 

Then comes the United Nations General Assembly, A/79/789, “Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse – Report of the Secretary-General” (17 February 2025). One can clearly notice how its very architecture, dense tables, aggregated indicators, and technical phrasing render the issue abstract, sterile, and distant. It categorizes suffering into percentages and trendlines, burying the human cost beneath methodology. In contrast, when one goes to the UN’s publicly accessible UN SEA misconduct data dashboard, the information is stark: individual dates, victims under 18, allegations of rape, the implementing entities involved. The dashboard is revealing, but almost no one consults it and certainly the Organisation benefits from that neglect.

The Secretary-General’s report reduces survivors to numerical entries processed through a statistical frame that neutralizes emotional and moral response. As with the enumeration of Palestinian casualties, human beings are converted into data units. Numerical abstraction becomes the mechanism of desensitization.

Let me give you a few examples of what the dashboard reveals.
Under the category of UN staff and related personnel:

  • Less than a week ago,  on 20 and 21 November,  two separate allegations were recorded against WHO personnel for sexual exploitation.
  • On 30 October, an allegation was filed against IOM for rape of a child by a UN Volunteer.
  • On 23, 21 and 20 October, three distinct allegations were filed for sexual assault of children under 18 in both IOM and UNRWA.

According to the same data, for 2024, children constituted 15% of victims, and disturbingly, an additional 17% were listed as “victim age unknown.” That alone illustrates how incomplete or deliberately under-specified the reporting is. For the same year, rape accounted for 13% of allegations, and sexual assault 20%. Assistance was provided in only 20% of cases, with the remainder categorized on the dashboard as “victim declined,” “victim did not seek assistance,” “victim unidentified,” or “victim unreachable.” This is the measure in practice of “do no harm” and of the supposed restoration of victims’ dignity.

Then there is the separate category of implementing partners whose personnel are not formally under UN authority but who execute UN-funded projects. 

  • On 4, 8, 9, 19 and 28 November 2025, five allegations were lodged for sexual assault, two involving children under 18 in connection with UNICEF-supported activities. 
  • On 9, 14, 16 and 19 October 2025, another four allegations were recorded, three of which were also for assault of children under 18, again linked to UNICEF-related projects.

I mean yes, these individuals are not UN staff; they are personnel of implementing partners. But the question is unavoidableis the UN exercising due diligence over the entities it entrusts with its mandate? 

Does the UN engage implementing partners to improve conditions for children, or are these partnerships,  through negligence or indifference, creating new avenues for their abuse?


In 2025 so far, there have been 41 allegations of rape, of which 37 involved children under 18. These were linked to projects implemented for:

  • UNICEF (14)
  • WFP (13)
  • WHO (4)
  • UNOPS (4)
  • UNHCR (3)
  • OCHA (1)

In 2024, children under 18 accounted for at least 28% of all SEA allegations and that figure is conservative, given that an additional 24% of victims were listed as “age unknown.” 

Rape constituted 12% of total allegations that year.

Then there is the category of peacekeeping and special political missions, where rape of children is clearly systemic. It is easier to avert one’s gaze,  but perhaps this is precisely where scrutiny must intensify.

And here I am also analyzing numbers. This is the trap inherent in quantitative reporting: patterns and ratios take over, and the individual victims disappear. Behind each statistic is a life: a child with a name, a family, a history, a future now fractured.

Who explains to a 10-year-old boy that he will be alright after being raped? Who provides care and schooling for a child born of sexual exploitation? Who treats the psychological, physical, and social scars inflicted by those who arrived under the blue flag claiming protection?

Why are we still here? Why are we reading these findings while maintaining the fiction that the UN enforces a zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse? Each year we hear the same prescriptions: more funding, more training, more risk-mapping, more awareness. Yet the same patterns recur.

The Secretary-General’s report to the General Assembly is extensive and data-heavy, but this is precisely the problem: its architecture buries the actual crisis under layers of metrics and operational jargon. And there, almost unnoticed in the middle of the document, sits the real revelation:


In 2024, 64,585 United Nations staff members responded to the annual perception survey on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse. Of those, 3.65% (2,360 people) stated that it was acceptable to pay for sex, and close to 1% (555) indicated that it was acceptable to engage in sexual activity with a child,  with one-third of those respondents occupying supervisory roles.

This alone reveals how embedded and normalized the culture of sexual exploitation and abuse has become within the UN and this does not even account for uniformed personnel, national police contingents, or military forces contributed by Member States to peacekeeping missions.

So why is the situation not improving and in several respects deteriorating? Policies are revised, bulletins updated, special coordination units created,  but the real deficit lies in accountability, and not only accountability for the direct perpetrator.

And what about the perpetrators who are shielded rather than sanctioned? What about the cases quietly buried because they involve personnel with the right connections or the right nationality? What about internal directives to “avoid reputational exposure” that override the rights of victims? 

The UN pursues low-level offenders as symbolic sacrifices while preserving the machinery that protects enablers, decision-makers, and silent bystanders. The Organization reports terminations as proof of resolve, yet accountability is never directed at those within HR, Legal, Ethics, or senior management who intervened to suppress complaints, stall proceedings, or intimidate victims. That is where the deeper accountability lies, and that is precisely where none is exercised.

Why is there no scrutiny of the senior officials who instruct HR and Legal to make cases “go away”? What about the victims who never report, either out of fear or because the system has taught them that nothing will happen? What about the managers whose first instinct is to protect their own reporting profile before the Security Council or the General Assembly? And what of the Legal and HR officers who invoke “insufficient evidence” as a procedural shield as though the absence of formal proof were not itself often the product of investigative indifference or institutional suppression?

The Secretary-General’s own report acknowledges that since 2006, approximately 750 paternity and child support claims arising from UN peace operations have been recorded with over 500 still unresolved. Most Member States have failed to take any meaningful steps toward resolution. Meanwhile, the children born of these abuses, many now approaching adulthood,  remain without schooling, without healthcare, without legal recognition, and trapped in lifelong stigma. They live in conditions of uncertainty and marginalization,  the direct human legacy of UN negligence.

Protracted investigation and disciplinary timelines are cited as “systemic challenges,” but they function as structural impediments to justice. Delays in inquiry, opaque handling of outcomes, and the absence of visible consequences reinforce a culture of impunity and corrode the Organization’s credibility. Even now, there remains no real accountability for those in leadership who failed in their obligation to act. The burden falls only on the isolated offender,  never on those who enabled, ignored, or suppressed the cases.

Alarmingly, in 2024, the internal survey itself recorded a stark indicator of institutional distrust: 6% of UN respondents,roughly 3,700 staff expressed no confidence in leadership’s ability to address sexual exploitation and abuse, up from 3% the previous year.The doubling reflects a measurable deterioration in trust in leadership.

The reality we must confront is this: a child in Bangui may flee from what he perceives as the threat (the militia or armed group) and run instead toward the UN blue helmets, whom he believes to be protectors. But the risk now is that he runs straight into the arms of his abuser. The UN’s personnel (civilian and military) leverage the UN’s image as a guardian and savior to secure access to vulnerable populations. They weaponize the very trust invested in the UN.

This is what makes the situation intolerable: the UN is not a bystander to these violations but the mechanism through which access to victims is enabled. When trust itself becomes the instrument of abuse, the UN mission has already failed at its fundamental duty: protection

Where Did the Money Go? Inside the UN’s Misuse of Member State Funding for Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

This week, I expose how Member States were told their contributions had funded “successful” projects for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, while the UN’s own auditors found those very projects had failed completely.

In striking contrast to the Secretary-General’s triumphant account of successfully implemented projects for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, the United Nations’ internal watchdog, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) depicts a system mired in mismanagement, absent oversight, and outcomes so hollow they verge on tragic irony.

Five projects costing over $815,000 were meant to help 628 survivors of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Central African Republic rebuild their lives. Instead, they reflected a pattern of institutional negligence disguised as implementation success.

Victims were trained in agriculture without access to land, in hairdressing without a hair dryer, and in pastry-making without ovens.

The so-called “income-generating activities” generated no income; only frustration. OIOS field visits to Alindao and Bambari found women who had dutifully completed their vocational courses yet could neither farm nor open a salon. Those trained in agriculture discovered only after graduation that they had no access to land whatsoever -no plots, no communal fields, no arrangements for leasing or use. The implementing office, astonishingly, had never verified whether participants owned or could access land before investing funds into agricultural training. In effect, they were trained for an activity that was structurally impossible.

Equally, those trained in hairdressing received “start-up kits” that omitted the most essential tools: no hair dryers, no scissors, no power supply solutions. OIOS noted that no market analysis or feasibility review had been conducted; the Mission never examined whether these trades were viable in the targeted areas or how victims might sustain them. The projects were conceived in spreadsheets, not in communities.

Projects were launched in locations chosen by “professional judgment”, meaning, effectively, at random. Communities with the largest number of victims, such as Dekoa and Sibut (which accounted for 21 per cent of all recorded victims), were simply left out.

The implementing partner, hand-picked without any comparative advantage analysis had no office, no staff, and no demonstrated capacity in the Central African Republic. There was no review committee, no competition, and no oversight. Trainers were recruited ad-hoc, curricula were missing for two of five courses, and attendance didn’t matter: beneficiaries who stopped attending still received completion certificates and start-up kits.

The project steering committee that should have provided governance was never established. Eleven of thirty-six weekly progress reports simply stated “Nothing to report” while projects were floundering. Even the Trust Fund team in DMSPC and the Senior Victims’ Rights Officer issued recommendations that went unheeded. The Mission failed to monitor progress, delayed disbursements, and excluded even basic provisions like transportation and food for trainees travelling several kilometres to training sites.

The result? A programme ostensibly designed to restore dignity to victims became a showcase of institutional negligence: vocational training without vocation, empowerment without power, assistance without assistance.

And yet, a triumph, according to the Secretary-General. While the OIOS audit revealed governance failure and zero impact, the Secretary-General (SG) presented an entirely different picture to the General Assembly.

In his report A/79/789 dated 17 February 2025, titled Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse, the Secretary-General cited these same projects as a model of success. He proudly reported that since 2016, $5.1 million from 25 Member States had funded 21 projects, including those in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, and South Sudan, with “medical care, psychological support and vocational training” provided to victims. He then called on Member States to move away from voluntary contributions and establish a “predictable and sustainable funding model.”

The Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, established in 2016, was created to bridge service gaps by providing vital support to complainants, victims, and children born as a result of sexual exploitation and abuse. The Fund’s governance is chaired by DMSPC, under USG Catherine Pollard, which also serves as the Implementing Office.

Its 2024 Annual Report echoed the Secretary-General’s optimism, claiming the “successful implementation and launch of 21 projects“, and emphasizing that “substantial resources are urgently needed to sustain support to victims”.

Its principal contributors listed in their own reports were:

  • United Kingdom – $1,117,000
  • United States – $620,000
  • Italy – $581,000
  • Norway – $393,000
  • Canada – $240,000
  • Japan – $200,000
  • Australia – $153,000
  • Bangladesh – $148,000
  • Germany – $120,000
  • India – $100,000
  • Nigeria – $100,000
  • Switzerland – $92,000
    Total: $5,188,000

Nice figures. Glossy charts. Positive reporting. 

The 2024 Annual Report reads like a success story, one slight problem, though: none of it was true.

The internal OIOS audit tells the opposite story: that the projects touted as successful in both the SG’s report and the Trust Fund’s annual report failed completely. The OIOS Report 2025/035, covering 1 January 2023 to 31 March 2025, detailed systemic failures:

  • No oversight or governance: No project steering committee was established to supervise implementation or review progress.
  • Arbitrary project locations: Sites were selected without predefined criteria, excluding major affected communities.
  • Copy-paste approach: The implementing partner simply replicated a vocational model used in another Mission, without any local context.
  • No due diligence: The partner was selected without comparative advantage analysis, and had no operational base in the country.
  • Missing curricula and unqualified trainers: For two of five courses, there were no curricula; the trainers’ qualifications were undocumented.
  • Certificates without competence: Beneficiaries who dropped out still received start-up kits and certificates.
  • Inflated costs and logistical chaos: Two of five MOUs omitted key delivery details, forcing MINUSCA to pay an additional $14,000 in transport.
  • Zero monitoring: Out of thirty-six progress reports, eleven contained no information while projects were ongoing.
  • Ignored recommendations: Repeated calls by oversight officers to fix basic deficiencies went unanswered.

The result, in OIOS’s own words, was that the projects “did not adequately meet the needs of victims” and failed to achieve any sustainable outcome. The contrast could not be starker:

  • OIOS found systemic failure, absence of oversight, and no measurable impact.
  • The Trust Fund celebrated completion and called for more funding. 
  • The Secretary-General reported success, progress, and implementation.

So which version of the truth did the Fifth Committee receive?

At stake is not only the credibility of the Trust Fund, financed by Member States such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Canada, Japan, and others, but also the integrity of the United Nations reporting system itself.

How can the Secretary-General speak of successful victim-assistance projects when his own internal audit reports describe them as failed, mismanaged, and without impact?

While the Secretary-General urges Member States to establish a sustainable funding model for the Trust Fund, the very projects financed by it could not sustain a single beneficiary.

The victims trained to bake without ovens and farm without land are not merely metaphors for bureaucratic incompetence, they are living proof of an accountability system that exists only on paper. Who will then tell the Member States that the UN’s own victims are still waiting for assistance and that the only thing the Organization managed to generate was another report?

A while ago, my colleague Lucas Mendos criticized the commentators who called UN reports “useless,” pointing out how people often confuse low download numbers with low relevance. He rightly noted that most UN reports are technical in nature, written for specialized audiences, and should never be judged by clicks.

But that argument assumes one thing: that the right people actually read them.

So why aren’t Member States reading these reports?

How is it that in the same United Nations, the Secretary-General can deliver a glowing account of success while his own internal oversight body is documenting complete failure?

How can he stand before the General Assembly and ask for a more “sustainable model of funding” when the very projects he cites have collapsed under his watch?

And what are the Member States and ACABQ delegates doing about it? Why are they even paid if they cannot monitor how their own assessed contributions are spent, or whether the projects they fund are implemented as reported?

And what about the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse: the women and children the Organization vowed to protect and whose dignity it promised to restore?

What kind of dignity is this, when their names appear in reports as “beneficiaries” of projects that never worked, that left them exactly where they began?

The Trust Fund was created to support the victims of exploitation. Instead, it exposes a system that exploits even their suffering to sustain its own image.

And to the Fifth Committee delegates: read the reports. No one else will.

NB: a copy of this article will be sent to the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of each Member State listed among the contributors to the Trust Fund — so they may see how their funding was used, and what their reports did not say.

Taking Note and Doing Nothing: The UN’s Broken Promises on Racism and Harassment

Why does the United Nations repeatedly fail to address the firmly entrenched issues of racism and harassment within its own ranks? 

Every year, the Ombudsman’s Office sounds the alarm, highlighting systemic failures in the workplace and devastating issues such as racism and harassment in the workplace. Every year, the Secretary-General presents these damning findings to the General Assembly. 

And every year, member states respond with the same meaningless ritual: they “take note” of the report.

What does it take to break this cycle of inaction? And what does this cycle of repetition reveal about the United Nations’ internal accountability mechanisms?

Over four years, these reports have consistently highlighted two systemic issues:

  1. Racism: Persistent, widespread, and damaging to organizational culture and staff well-being.
  2. Systemic Upward Harassment: Particularly targeting senior female leaders, exacerbated by gender discrimination and patriarchal workplace norms.

Yet, despite repeated observations, no significant actions have been taken. In response to this ongoing inaction, on 22 November 2024, the Chair of the Sixth Committee (Legal) sent a letter to the Chair of the Fifth Committee, underscoring the importance of addressing the persistent issues raised in reports submitted by the Secretary-General, specifically the activities of the Office of the United Nations Ombudsman and Mediation Services (A/79/156).


Digging Into the Reports: A Closer Look at the Evidence

To understand the scale of this failure, we examine the Secretary-General’s reports from 2020 to 2024. Each year, the Ombudsman documented systemic racism and harassment, particularly against senior female leaders. Each year, the same issues resurfaced, unresolved.

2020 (A/75/160): “Upward Harassment” and Racism

The 2020 report noted:

“As the Organization moves towards the goal of gender parity, one negative effect is an increase in upward professional harassment, or mobbing directed at female managers at senior and other levels. A new female manager who is the subject of mobbing does not always find the support needed from senior management… She may have to build a network while negative information about her is being disseminated by those disgruntled at her appointment…she has to address gender discrimination in addition to mobbing.”

On racism, the Secretary-General reaffirmed in a letter that racism “violated the Charter and debased the core values of its community”.

Despite these critical issues being identified, no systemic changes were implemented, and these problems would resurface in future reports.


2021 (A/76/140): Skepticism on Racism

The 2021 report noted staff skepticism about the UN’s ability to address racism.

“The degree of awareness of racism in the workplace spans a wide range, from those who believe it does not exist to those who have experienced it and are highly sceptical as to whether it will ever be addressed in a meaningful way. Continuous learning and education on racism will be necessary to embed an anti-racist awareness and culture in the Organization.”

The persistence of skepticism among staff highlights the UN’s failure to address racism meaningfully, despite acknowledging its presence.


2022 (A/77/151): The Failure to Tackle Intersectional Bias

The Ombudsman 2022 report highlighted how multiple forms of discrimination—gender, race, age, and ableism—intersected to harm staff, particularly women in leadership. Despite a flexible regulatory framework, patriarchal workplace cultures rendered reforms ineffective.

“Racial discrimination may manifest itself in different, often subtle ways, from microaggressions to overt racism. Often, several elements intersect, for instance gender and racial discrimination, perceived age discrimination, and ableism… Even when the regulatory framework might allow for flexibility, it was often not applied by managers and a patriarchal workplace culture persisted.”

“Women, especially those appointed to senior positions, reported that they seemed to be measured by different standards compared with their male counterparts. Several women leaders contacted the Office about the harassment they experienced, ranging from microaggressions to overt aggression.”

2022 marked yet another year of the same issues being observed, with systemic discrimination entrenched and no clear evidence of concrete interventions or changes.


2023 (A/78/170): Racism’s Toll on Mental Health

Staff reported feeling unseen and devalued. Victims of racism sacrificed their mental and physical health to combat systemic issues. 

The 2023 Ombudsman report noted:

“Many United Nations staff feel marginalized, unseen, and not valued. Daily interactions and treatment of personnel are perceived to be misaligned with the aspirational frameworks of the Organization, with a negative impact on organizational culture. Victims of racism have engaged in addressing racism to the detriment of their health.”

Despite the creation of an Anti-Racism Team, the lack of tangible outcomes reflected a continued failure to address the root causes of these issues.


2024 (A/79/156): The Failure of Formal Complaints to Address Racism

Staff continued to report incidents of racism and bias, and the formal complaints process proved inadequate. 

Under Addressing Racial Bias and Discrimination, the 2024 report revealed that racism continued to persist within the organization, despite increased efforts to address it. While more employees have come forward to report incidents, the reliance on formal complaints channels has proven largely ineffective in resolving the issue. The report underscored that addressing bias requires more than formal processes; it necessitates an environment where staff feel safe to raise concerns and challenge discrimination without fear of retaliation. Until such an environment exists, racism will remain a deeply entrenched issue.

The systemic issues identified in the 2020 report were still unresolved four years later.


Why Is the UN Losing the Battle Against Racism and Harassment?

Over four years, the Ombudsman’s reports have exposed a damning reality: a workplace entrenched in systemic racism and harassment. And yet, nothing changes. The question is not whether the issues are clear—they are—but why the United Nations continues to ignore them. The answers are as alarming as the failures themselves:

1. The Secretary-General’s Missed Opportunities

The SG has the authority to act decisively, implementing reforms, holding senior leaders accountable, strengthen the Ombudsman’s mandate, and push member states to prioritize internal justice. 

However, the SG’s failure to act decisively has perpetuated systemic dysfunction, damaged staff morale, and undermined trust in the UN’s commitment to its values. 

Year after year, the SG chooses not to act. Is it fear of disrupting internal power structures? Apathy? Or a belief that these issues are not worth prioritizing?

2. Member States Perpetuating Inertia

Member states also bear significant responsibility for this inertia. Despite funding the Ombudsman’s Office through assessed contributions, they refuse to hold the UN accountable for acting on its findings. Instead, they prioritize budgetary efficiency and avoid politically sensitive discussions about harassment and racism.

Why fund a mechanism that reveals systemic failures if you have no intention of fixing them? By failing to act, member states perpetuate the UN’s inefficiency and undermine its credibility. It becomes a bureaucratic exercise that neither protects staff nor aligns with the organization’s stated values.

3. Bureaucracy as a Shield

The UN’s deeply ingrained bureaucracy enables inaction. Critical findings are buried in processes and paperwork, allowing systemic problems to persist unchecked. Reports are “taken note of”—and promptly ignored.


Burnout and Brain Drain: The Cost of Inaction

The human cost is immense. Talented senior women and minority staff leave in frustration, their careers derailed by harassment and discrimination. Victims of racism suffer in silence or jeopardize their health fighting an unyielding system. Each year of inaction chips away at the UN’s credibility as an institution meant to uphold justice and equality.

The UN cannot keep ignoring these issues without losing whatever credibility it has left. If the Ombudsman’s reports are worth the paper they’re written on, they must lead to real change. Member states need to stop playing bureaucratic hide-and-seek, and the Secretary-General must decide whether leadership is a title or a responsibility.

But let’s be honest—next year, the same report will be submitted, and once again, it will be ‘noted.’

Because if there’s one thing the UN excels at, it’s inaction perfected to an art form. At this rate, we’ll be ‘taking note’ of the same issues for another decade.

Swept Under the Rug: Grooming and Pedophilia Allegations Covered Up by Senior UNHQ Officials

Trigger Warning: This content discusses sensitive topics, including sexual harassment, grooming, pedophilia, and abuse of authority. Reader discretion is advised

A Judgment Detached from Reality

On 11 November 2024, the United Nations Appeals Tribunal (UNAT) issued a final judgment in the case of Sandi Arnold vs. the Secretary-General of the United Nations Judgment No. 2024-UNAT-1477. That judgment is itself the final blow in the face of justice within the UN and highlights the systemic corruption of senior officials at UNHQ. The judgment, astonishingly, has little connection to the reality it purportedly addresses because by the time it was issued, Sandi Arnold had already been dismissed by the UN the previous year. How can this be?

Arnold, a long-term UN staff member, was implicated in a series of deeply troubling incidents during her tenure, yet senior officials, including an Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) at UNHQ, actively shielded her from accountability. The allegations against her ranged from sexual harassment to abuse of authority, and even extended to grooming and pedophilia. Yes, you read that correctly.

A Series of Troubling Allegations

Prior to joining UNMIK, Arnold served as UNRWA Deputy Director of Operations in Syria, where the first allegations of sexual harassment against her emerged. According to former UNRWA sources, Arnold organized informal outings, including taking local female staff members to a hairdresser on Saturdays for what appeared to be casual social gatherings. However, these events reportedly escalated into instances where Arnold made sexually suggestive remarks and allusions. Distressed by her behavior, the female staff lodged internal complaints. Arnold was quietly asked to leave Syria immediately.

She was subsequently reassigned to UNHQ in New York, and by February 2017, she had secured the role of Chief of Mission Support (CMS) at the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) at the D-1 level position.

The allegations against Arnold began surfacing in 2019 when the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) received multiple reports of her misconduct. Among the most disturbing incidents was the gifting of sex toys to female colleagues. According to the judgment, Arnold purchased a sex toy during a trip to New York and later gifted it to a subordinate. The judgment noted that this act “transgressed the boundary between the professional and personal life of her subordinate” and carried the potential to “negatively impact the image and interests of the Organization”.

Over the following year, 15 additional complaints were filed, painting a deeply troubling picture of her behavior. Arnold frequently referred to colleagues using offensive nicknames based on physical characteristics or national origins, such as “Choo Choo” and “Ju Ju Eyes.” The judgment highlighted that this practice “created a significant risk of dividing staff on national origin” and was deemed patently inappropriate in a multicultural workplace.

Her bullying tactics further compounded the harm. In one incident detailed in the judgment, Arnold shouted at a subordinate during a printing task, hurling expletives and saying,

“Will you f…ing print the policy itself?” When dissatisfied with the result, she escalated to throwing the document at the staff member and shouting repeatedly: “F….you, f*** off, go f*** yourself.”

This incident, corroborated by multiple witnesses, left the subordinate deeply humiliated and caused significant emotional distress.

One particularly distressing account revealed that Arnold’s repeated bullying led a staff member to contemplate suicide. The judgment noted that her behavior “violated the minimum level of civility expected in the workplace” and had a devastating emotional toll on her victims . The CMS was undeniably an abusive leader whose actions caused significant harm to her colleagues, leaving many emotionally devastated and others nearly broken beyond repair.

A System That Shields the Powerful

Arnold was placed on administrative leave with full pay in January 2022 while OIOS finalized its investigation. When OIOS finalized their investigation which took almost two years *while the CMs was on full pay- great use of member states funds again btw- they sent the report to OHR for action. Incredibly, rather than addressing the gravity of these allegations with decisive action, the UN’s disciplinary response was appallingly lenient.

The United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) and United Nations Appeals Tribunal (UNAT) both reviewed the case. The UNDT confirmed that the CMS’s actions constituted misconduct. The judgments emphasized the failure to maintain the dignity of staff and the damage inflicted on the UN’s image. As the UNDT noted: “The CMS’s actions violated the standards expected of a senior leader, crossing professional and personal boundaries, and creating a hostile work environment.”

The UNAT upheld these findings, dismissing the CMS’s appeal and affirming the proportionality of the disciplinary measures. Yet, rather than terminating her employment, the disciplinary measures imposed consisted of a written censure (the lowest disciplinary measure under Chapter |X of the rules) and an administrative measure of a mandatory managerial coaching for one year.

The Role of Senior Officials: Protecting the Perpetrator

This leniency was not accidental.

According to multiple sources, a high-ranking ASG at UNHQ intervened on Arnold’s behalf, ensuring the disciplinary measures were minimal and shielding her from the full consequences of her actions.

Emboldened by this interference, Arnold not only avoided severe repercussions but also appealed the disciplinary measure to the UNDT, launching a determined fight to clear her name.

Meanwhile, her victims were left terrorized and paralyzed, fearing further retaliation at every turn. Rather than seeking to restore integrity and foster a safe, supportive environment in UNMIK, the ASG’s actions prioritized protecting the interests of one individual: Sandi Arnold.

This interference not only undermined the credibility of the UN’s disciplinary and accountability system but also sent a chilling message to victims of abuse within the organization: their suffering is secondary to the careers of those in power.

Can anyone truly imagine what it feels like to be in the shoes of these victims? What values would they believe in after enduring this nightmare?

And so, with this deal sealed, Arnold’s suspension was lifted, and she was incredibly allowed to return to work on 3 October 2022.

The emotional toll on her victims was nothing short of catastrophic. Three staff members reportedly considered suicide, while several others required ongoing treatment to cope with the trauma inflicted under her leadership. Feeling abandoned and unprotected, and fearing further retaliation, many of her victims made the decision to leave the mission altogether. The repercussions extended far beyond the workplace, impacting their families as well. The toxic environment fostered by Arnold’s actions, combined with the UN’s failure to respond effectively, compounded the distress and left a lasting scar on the personal lives of those affected.

Unspoken Crimes? Allegations of Grooming and Pedophilia?

What happened next is shockingly absent from both the UNDT/UNAT judgments and any subsequent public decisions.

Allegations of grooming and pedophilia surfaced. Reports emerged that Arnold had allegedly groomed the children of staff members and taken them on private trips under highly suspicious circumstances, raising serious concerns about her conduct. Despite these numerous allegations and staff members fleeing the mission, Arnold was allowed to return to work.

She continued in her role for almost a year and a half, wreaking havoc and causing a severe emotional toll on her victims. Then, in November 2023, she was suddenly dismissed.

The Office of Human Resources (OHR) did not provide any explanation, and there is no official document detailing the reasons for her termination.

Those chilling allegations beg the question: how could the UN’s senior management at UNHQ allow such behavior to continue unchecked? How could they permit such a CMS to return to work, further exacerbating the harm to staff and their families?

By reinstating Arnold despite these unresolved allegations, the UN effectively prioritized the interests of an ASG—who was reportedly a friend of Arnold—and their own bureaucratic agendas over the safety and well-being of its staff. This decision, made under the guise of procedural fairness, trampled on the basic principles of accountability and justice. The silence and inaction of senior officials at UNHQ is as damning as the misconduct itself.

The Scars of Injustice on Victims

Arnold’s final dismissal in October 2023, after years of reports and investigations, underscores the UN’s systemic failure to act decisively against misconduct. This failure is starkly contrasted by the profound emotional toll and the devastating impact on the mental health of staff members, many of whom required ongoing treatment or chose to leave UNMIK entirely.

Such outcomes stand in sharp contradiction to the Secretary-General’s much-publicized system-wide strategy on mental health, which claims to prioritize the well-being of UN personnel. How can this strategy hold any credibility when the actions—and inactions—of senior management so blatantly undermine its very purpose?

A Corrupt and Broken Disciplinary Process

This case is emblematic of a critical, yet deliberately obscured, problem within the UN’s investigative and disciplinary processes.

Senior officials’ interference in disciplinary matters undermines the organization’s credibility, leaving victims without justice while emboldening perpetrators.

The OIOS investigation, which dragged on for over two years, highlights the inefficiencies of a system that prioritizes procedural delays over meaningful and substantive outcomes. The UN must confront the systemic failures exposed by this case and hold accountable the senior officials who failed all these victims.

Unfortunately, a culture that tolerates such egregious misconduct and allows it to persist unchallenged will only serve to embolden further perpetrators, perpetuating harm and eroding trust in the organization.

How the UN discriminates against its own Palestinian staff.



Many are unaware that the 102 United Nations staff whom Israel killed in Gaza were all Palestinians.

They were all local staff.

They were all from UNRWA.

UN offices worldwide lowered their flags to half-mast on November 13th, mourning the loss of 102 UNRWA staff killed by Israel since the start of the war in Gaza.

Ceremonies, statements and condemnations.

In remembrance, a minute of silence and vigils were held.

Nothing but a Facade.

In the history of the UN, this has been the highest death toll among UN staff in a short period.

What explains this?

The UN has specific security policies that apply to all personnel. UNRWA sets itself apart from other organizations because the majority of its staff is local, and the minority is international. In Gaza alone, there are approximately 13,000 local UNRWA staff members.

When the Security Phase in a country is deemed Critical, the UN evacuates the international staff to a designated safe haven outside the duty station. All UN offices have security plans in place that are constantly being updated. For local staff, the UN Security policy designates a safe haven within the same duty station.

For UNRWA, this could have meant, for example, designating Rafah as a safe haven.

What prevented this from being done?

The UNRWA local staff were not included in the UNDSS security system at any time. This is as straightforward as it gets. As a result, they have been denied a fundamental right: to be safeguarded against attacks of inhuman proportions. They were killed by Israel while delivering humanitarian services to Palestinians and sleeping in their homes with their families.

Why?

Because they are Palestinians?

Why?

Because they are too many?

Why?

Because designating a safe haven has additional cost implications?

Why?

Or is it because Palestinian lives are cheap and disposable?

Meanwhile, all international staff have been evacuated outside Gaza. Near the Rafah border on the Palestinian side, there are only a few international staff left.

If the 2014 Gaza war taught us anything, it should have been to implement a more inclusive security policy for local UNRWA staff during war times.

Yesterday, a journalist asked the UN spokesperson whether the UN was concerned about the UN staff in Gaza?

The Spokesman replied:

“ I mean, the UN staff in Gaza, the 13,000 or so UN staff there in Gaza are Gazans, right?  They’re Palestinians.  They are suffering along with the people that they serve”



They’re Gazans! They’re Palestinians!



As if Palestinians are destined to suffer…

As if Palestinians are destined to be killed and dismembered…

Mr. Spokesperson, that’s not correct.

Palestinian staff in Gaza are, first and foremost, United Nations staff. You have a responsibility to protect them while they deliver their work under the United Nations emblem.

The Blue Flag is certainly not worthy of the Palestinian staff.

We want to ask you, Mr. Secretary General, why can’t you make former staff members “Whole” again?

The Secretary-General relentlessly pursues his attempts to circumvent the proper Administration of Justice by forcing his proposals to amend the Statute of the Dispute Tribunal. 

A few days ago, the latest report of the Secretary-General A/78/156 on the Administration of Justice at the United Nations was released. 

Besides the numerous pages of redundant data on the number of cases submitted and adjudicated, data useless to member states, the Secretary-General, and his counsels launched their relentless attacks against the United Nations Dispute Tribunal.

They accused the UNDT of failing to respect the role of the Secretary-General and his authority to impose disciplinary measures on staff members who engage in misconduct.

The Secretary-General further accused the Tribunal of failing to respect the operational independent role of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).

According to the Secretary-General, his proposed amendment is intended solely to ensure that the legal framework established by the General Assembly is respected and that the Dispute Tribunal conducts a judicial review of the disciplinary measure and gives evidentiary weight to evidence collected by the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

Reading through the Secretary-General’s report, member states must remember the number of staff representing them who fell prey to the Secretary-General’s injustices throughout the years. 

Wrongdoing, retaliation, oppression, discrimination, malicious allegations, unlawful terminations, and dismissals that neither the system of Administration of Justice could remedy, nor the successive Secretary-Generals had an interest in correcting.

You can’t make them “Whole” again, Mr. Secretary-General, can you?

Image courtesy of Saatchi.

Not only you are unable to do so, but you are reluctant to do so.

Not only are you reluctant to do so, but you’re determined to eviscerate any notion left remotely associated with the Administration of Justice for staff. 

In your latest report, you claim that your sole intent is to ensure that the legal framework established by the General Assembly is respected. 

As a reminder, Mr. Secretary-General GA Resolution A/RES/63/253* adopted by member states on 24 December 2008 has called explicitly for a transparent new system of Administration of justice consistent with the principles of the rule of law and “due process to ensure respect for the rights and obligations of staff members and the accountability of managers and staff members alike.”

So, we would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, why is it then when a staff member has been wrongly separated, through no fault of their own but rather as a result of managerial abuse and retaliation, your decision was systematically taken to pay them compensation instead of considering their reintegration?

We ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, why is it so, even when the Tribunal found them profoundly wronged, retaliated against, and never afforded due process? 

We ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, why is it so, even when the Tribunal ruled that your representatives and counsels have cast untruthful allegations against them and that OIOS had consistently lied throughout their reports without adducing evidence?

We want to ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, why is it that your representatives and managers can easily have their mistakes and misdeeds buried with the careers of those staff members who have been ruined thereby? 

We ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, why do you not allow the Tribunal to redress the injustices suffered by the staff?

We ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, why is it that there has yet to be a record of any action that you have ever taken after a referral for accountability made by the Tribunal?

Not only have you never held any of your managers accountable for their abuse, retaliation, and corruption, but you are now intent on reducing the role and judicial authority of the UN Tribunal to nil.

Your proposal to amend article 9 (4)  of the Statute of the Dispute Tribunal is subversive and aimed at annihilating any due process left to staff members during legal proceedings. 

The UNDT has rejected your proposal explicitly and repeatedly, but you choose conveniently to keep relegating such criticism to buried annexes at the deep end of your reports to deter member states’ attention from them.

Here they are, harsh words, reproduced below:

“The amendment proposed by the Secretary-General (the proposal) is unacceptable in its broad claim to administrative discretion. 

It subverts the established basic premises of fairness while radically limiting the role of the Dispute Tribunal in the examination of the impugned sanctioning decision. 

Accepting this amendment would go beyond the practice that had been in place before the new line of jurisprudence and would reduce the Dispute Tribunal to a façade of an independent court. 

The proposal states that the Dispute Tribunal only reviews the factual foundation of the disciplinary decision on the basis of evidence before the Secretary- General at the time when the decision was taken. 

This impermissibly limits the Tribunal’s role as an independent fact-finder, as it does not allow for the evidence to be presented before it directly, even where necessary and available, and as such, does not make any provision for the eventuality of an incomplete or poorly documented investigation. 

It, moreover, removes from the Tribunal’s purview any newly discovered or newly produced evidence. 

Relying on incomplete material by the Dispute Tribunal would go against the principle of substantive rationality and procedural fairness, especially given that, according to the jurisprudence, investigative organs are not obliged to actively collect evidence in favour of the staff member. 

As it is with any independent court or Tribunal, the determination must be made upon the facts put before it, and not retrospectively;

The proposal shifts the burden of proof on the applicant, contrary to the long-established jurisprudence, which embraces the universal principle that the Administration bears the burden of establishing that the alleged misconduct occurred, sometimes outright called a presumption of innocence 

For all the aforesaid reasons, the proposal should not be adopted. “

You claim that your proposed amendment is intended solely to ensure that the legal framework established by the General Assembly is respected.

Deceitful claims to make before the General Assembly.

Between 2009 and 2022, under your delegated authority, seventy-five staff, chiefs, and directors were wrongfully terminated and retaliated against by the Secretary-General. 

The UNDT and UNAT ruled in their favor, finding that the termination decisions were unlawful, ill-motivated, and lacking due process. 

In the seventy-five cases, the UNDT and UNAT ordered their reinstatement.

In every case, you and your legal counsels opted for compensation instead of reinstatement.

Every single case.

The list is attached.

Seventy-five staff.

For twelve consecutive years.

What respect for the Organization’s legal framework are you talking about?

Instead of releasing your recent report to member states, one UNDT judgment (Nakhlawi) is sufficient to show them the subversion of the system of justice under your leadership and serves to remind them of their legislative authority, which has been consistently circumvented by you and your legal counsels:

“The failure of management to give individual consideration to each case in which rescission of a termination decision is ordered, contradicts the spirit and legislative intent of the General Assembly of art. 10.5 of its Statute. 

By that article, the General Assembly created an expectation for staff members that in cases where the Tribunal orders rescission of a termination decision, the Administration will give due consideration to the possibility of reintegration before it considers the payment of the amount of compensation set in lieu of rescission, as determined by the Tribunal. 

The Tribunal is of the view that this matter goes to the core of the creation of the “new” internal justice system and the very nature of the accountability of management and the duty of management, and the Organization, towards each and every member of staff, if he or she has done no wrong.

 It finds that the policy behind the Tribunal’s Statute and the whole system of justice is put at risk by the attitude of management to systematically opt for the payment in lieu of rescission under art. 10.5(a). 

The Tribunal finds the fact that the Administration was unable to present a single case where individual consideration was given to rescission and subsequent reintegration under art. 10.5(a) of the Statute, shows that it fails to exercise the discretion accorded to it under that article. 

Failure to exercise discretion is in itself illegal and improper. 

It is for the General Assembly to consider whether the underlying policy objective is being frustrated by what appears to be an unwritten policy operated by senior managers.”

Mr. Secretary-General, if you’re still intent on amending the Statute of the UNDT out of respect for the Organization’s legal framework,  consider amending one item of art. 10.5:

Make reinstatement mandatory and eradicate the option of compensation in lieu of reinstatement.

Anything short of that is an abuse of justice.

For without an Order of Reinstatement, the United Nations Tribunal cannot make an Applicant “Whole” again.

The United Nations Dispute Tribunal at the Mercy of the Secretary-General

How the Secretary-General keeps circumventing the authorities of the Tribunal to gain total control of the judiciary power.

Another damning report that will eventually go unnoticed during the seventy-eight session of the General Assembly is the Internal Justice Council A/78/121 report, which the General Assembly will consider under item 144 of the preliminary list (Administration of Justice at the United Nations).

The General Assembly established the Internal Justice Council in its resolution 62/228 to ensure independence, professionalism, and accountability in the system of Administration of justice.

In its most recent report, the Internal Justice Council voiced its scathing objection and criticism of the Secretary-General’s attempts to unilaterally amend the rules of procedure of the UN Dispute Tribunal to gain total control over the judicial authority of the UNDT and particularly circumventing the power of the Tribunals and the role of Internal Justice Council.

In essence, the Secretary-General aims to deprive the UNDT of its primary function: the function of the judicial review of an administrative or disciplinary decision.

The Rules of procedure of the UNDT are essential to ensure the efficiency and independence of the Tribunals. Further, establishing rules of procedure is the statutory prerogative of the Tribunals, subject to the approval of the General Assembly. 

The statute of the Dispute Tribunal, as adopted by the Assembly in its resolution 63/253, provides in particular under Article 7: 

“Subject to the provisions of the present statute, the Dispute Tribunal shall establish its own rules of procedure, which shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.”

It is evident in plain words that, should there be instances in which there are attempts to modify the UNDT’s rules of procedure, the Tribunals should be allowed to articulate their stances before the Fifth Committee and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. 

In addition, the Internal Justice Council noted that the Administration must consult the Tribunals before proposing any legislative amendments affecting the functioning of the Tribunals. 

So what did the Secretary-General propose, and how did he provoke the wrath of the stakeholders, starting with the UNDT/UNAT, ILOAT, and most recently, the Internal Justice Council? 

Article 2.1 (b) of the Dispute Tribunal’s current statute confers the power to conduct a judicial review of an administrative decision, which is a judicial power in all major judicial systems globally. This includes the ability to determine the basis for the challenged decision, including the accuracy of the factual basis.

The Secretary-General proposed to the General Assembly to amend the statute of the Dispute Tribunal by introducing a new article 9.4.:

The proposed article 9.4 seeks to change the jurisprudence of the Appeals Tribunal on the interpretation of article 2.1 (b) of the statute of the Dispute Tribunal to prevent it from making any judicial enquiry on the factual basis on which an administrative decision imposing a disciplinary measure is based. Too complicated?

In previous judgments, the UNDT had likened the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) reports to a police inquiry and thus found that such reports are subject to a judicial review and determination of whether misconduct occurred or not.

In plain reader-friendly words, what does this mean to you, the staff member? 

It simply means that should you be accused of misconduct, and the Administration provides the Tribunal with what, in their opinion, is an untouchable report by OIOS, the Tribunal retains the right to consider that the OIOS report was flawed, biased, and/or possibly totally lacking evidence.

Thus, we understand that the Tribunal has a right to test the evidence, to require further proof, or to rule that the OIOS evidence was of no value and consequently to rescind the administrative or disciplinary measure taken against you.

Here comes the Secretary-General.

He proposes that the Tribunal has no right to question the OIOS report and should accept it as it is.

He further suggests that the Tribunals should automatically abide by OIOS’ sacred reports. 

In other words, OIOS investigations can never be wrong, nor can they ever contain mistakes, be they factual or analytic.

In other words, OIOS is above the law.

In other words, OIOS reports are always accurate and factual. They are a sound basis for any disciplinary decision the Secretary-General takes that cannot be challenged before the Tribunal.

To test OIOS’ high-quality reports, we only need to have a quick look at ten identical judgments issued by the UNDT last week UNDT/2023/096 UNDT/2023/097 UNDT/2023/098 UNDT/2023/099 UNDT/2023/100 UNDT/2023/101 UNDT/2023/102 UNDT/2023/103 UNDT/2023/104 and UNDT/2023/105.

Reading only one will prove how efficient, diligent, and meticulous OIOS investigation reports are. 

In brief, Cigna, the Organization’s medical insurance provider, reported

“allegations of possible medical insurance provider fraud” to the Investigations Division of OIOS. As a result, OIOS began investigations into these allegations, accusing the national staff of possible medical insurance fraud. Thus, OIOS recommended withholding the final separation entitlements of the ten staff members and putting on hold the processing of pension paperwork for national staff whose appointments were not renewed due to the closure of the Kalemie office of MONUSCO in 2022.”

Let us now have a look at a few excerpts from the Tribunal’s judgments:

“It appears that the OIOS investigation was riddled with problems. Indeed, the record in this case is devoid of details about the investigation at all.

Even today, we do not know what was investigated, whether the investigation was ever completed, and if so, what it found about the “possible fraud.” 

“This absence of evidence is astounding given over four years of systematic monitoring, the passage of two and a half years since OIOS was first notified of the allegations of possible fraud and began to investigate, and more than a year after the disputed decision to withhold the Applicant’s separation entitlements and pension paperwork “until the investigation has been concluded and the findings support the imposition of financial recovery …  

Despite the OIOS promise giving rise to the decision that “[a]s per normal practice, OIOS will issue reports for each staff member at the completion of its investigations, with an indication of the quantified MIP fraud should this be established,” no report has been presented to the Tribunal”

Perhaps the closest thing to an OIOS report in the record is an email from the Acting Deputy Director of the Africa Regional Office, Investigations Division of OIOS, which does not describe any of the “evidence that OIOS has”, and it also describes confusion as to who was on the list to be investigated.

OIOS interviewed the Applicant about the possible fraud allegations the day before his separation, but the record contains no evidence about that interview- what he was told about the allegations, the status of the investigation to that point, and his response. 

The record in this case lacks any evidence whatsoever of the nature of the alleged fraud, how the OrganizationOrganization suffered any financial loss, and how any alleged financial loss was calculated. The case consists of a series of black boxes. 

The third black box is the OIOS investigation. Again, the Tribunal was not told what evidence OIOS uncovered over the course of its year-and-a-half investigation. Indeed, the few crumbs of “evidence” that were produced in this case were contradictory and unreliable. 

In conclusion, in the absence of any evidence to support the Administration’s decision, the Tribunal must find that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.”

So, after we noted OIOS’ immaculate and meticulous investigation reports, we return to the Secretary General’s proposal to amend the UNDT statute to prevent the Tribunals from putting in doubt the veracity, authenticity, or evidentiary value of OIOS reports.

The recent UNDT Judgments referred to above demonstrate the importance of the Tribunal’s authority to conduct a judicial review of the administrative decision and to assess the OIOS evidence presented to it under Article 2.1 (b) of the Dispute Tribunal’s current statute.

The above Judgments inherently show how your rights as a staff member are upheld during the proceedings of the Tribunals and how you are protected from the flawed, biased, and frequently purposely ill-founded OIOS reports.

This is, in essence, what the Secretary-General proposes to abolish through the amendment of the UNDT statute and the introduction of his proposed article 9.4

We should note that this proposal is a grave prejudice to the rights of staff members to due process as the staff member has a right to be presented with concrete evidence and to be given a fair opportunity to rebut it before the Tribunal. However, the Secretary-General believes this should not be allowed.

Appalled by the Secretary-General’s proposals, the Internal Justice Council noted in its report the following scathing remarks:

“The Council wishes to emphasize the difference between investigative and adjudicative powers. The Council respectfully considers that the submissions and the proposed statutory amendment are flawed and disagrees with the submissions.

The proposal that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution for the purpose of overturning the judicial decisions of which the Administration, being a party to the judicial proceeding, disapproves is contrary to the universally accepted principle of judicial independence. 

The adoption of such a resolution would signal that the General Assembly will compel the Tribunals to adopt submissions of management in disputes to which they are parties, thereby depriving or at least appearing to deprive staff of the right to an independent and impartial hearing of their appeal against an administrative decision imposing a disciplinary measure. 

The proposal offends the most basic principle of justice, the audi alteram partem rule, in this case the right of a person who complains against an administrative decision imposing a disciplinary measure to be heard in their defence. 

The role of OIOS in the disciplinary process is to investigate and transmit the results of investigations together with recommendations. 

It has no power to exercise any adjudicative function and no duty to hear and consider the position of the complainant, nor to provide the complainant with a copy of its report. 

At the time at which the Secretary-General takes a decision based on the said report, it has not undergone any evaluation and may contain the types of errors that are universally consistent with the investigative process. 

An administrative decision that is based on a report that contains errors of fact will inevitably reflect those errors.

The only opportunity that a complainant has to contribute to or appeal against the findings on which the decision is based is that provided by article 2.1 (b) of the statute of the Dispute Tribunal.

It is respectfully submitted that the jurisprudence of the Appeals Tribunal is consistent with universally accepted principles of judicial review, which must include an opportunity for a judicial interrogation of the factual basis on which the decision is made. 

28. The Council expresses its concern that the passage of the proposed article 9.4 will undermine the independence of the internal judicial system of the United Nations, and respectfully recommends that it not be adopted by the General Assembly. “

To reflect more on what the Secretary-General considers as untouchable sacred OIOS reports, we draw his attention to a recent report by the Joint Inspection Unit JIU/REP/2020/1 on the review of the state of the investigation function: progress made in the United Nations system organizations in strengthening the investigation function which has pointed out the severe deficiencies in OIOS investigations:

“Despite progress made in enhancing the independence of the investigation function, addressing function fragmentation and establishing professional investigation capabilities, the investigation function continues to face significant problems, including: 

A continuing widespread and unacceptable degree of fragmentation of the responsibility for investigations in many organizations, where investigations and investigation-related work (i.e. intake and preliminary assessment) are carried out by various other offices and functions.

The resulting risks from this fragmentation are, among others: that the independence, impartiality and objectivity of the investigation function and the activities carried out by it are not assured; the inherent risk of conflict of interest situations; and the negative consequences in terms of quality, accountability and trust.

Another shortcoming is the lack of common investigation procedures and standards in some organizations and, although the professional competence of investigators is a decisive factor for investigations, the absence of professional investigators in some, but not all, organizations. With regard to the latter, no progress has been made in six organizations since 2011. 

A still insufficient degree of structural autonomy and operational independence of the investigation function, hence inadequate safeguards against interference by management.

Independence is a decisive prerequisite for the effective delivery of the investigation mandate and for the unbiased, objective and effective discharge of the investigation responsibilities.

Despite this damning negative evidence against OIOS, the Secretary-General is marching forward with his proposal.

The General Assembly will consider the Internal Justice Council report and other reports relating to the Administration of Justice on the 1st, 2nd, and 28th of November 2023. 

We hope that the Member States and ACABQ play a more active role in maintaining the judiciary balance of the Organization instead of just taking note of the present report.

“Review of the jurisdictional set-up of the United Nations Common System” – the Secretary-General’s new alarming report to the 78th General Assembly session

After fiercely objecting to the proposals of the UNDT and the UNAT to amend their rules of procedures to restore a more balanced approach to justice benefitting staff and helping curtail the Secretary-General’s maneuvering in court proceedings, which are many, the Secretary-General has now submitted his report and proposals on the “Review of the jurisdictional set-up of the United Nations Common System” A/78/154

The report will be considered during the 78th upcoming session of the General Assembly, which is due to open today.

To recall the background, the General Assembly, in its resolution 77/257, invited the Secretary-General to complete the work on the outstanding legal and practical aspects of the review of the jurisdictional set-up of the United Nations Common System, including finalizing past proposals and assessing the viability of other options. 

The Secretary General’s new report A/78/154 includes a finalized proposal for a joint chamber of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (ILOAT) and the United Nations Appeals Tribunal (UNAT).

It also includes an evaluation of other options that could help, according to the Secretary-General, to preserve the unity of the United Nations Common System in the context of two independent tribunal systems.

This proposal stems from conflicting tribunal judgments that the ILOAT and the UNAT previously issued following decisions taken by the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) in 2017 concerning the classification of duty stations and their respective post adjustments.

In summary, the Secretary-General considers that establishing a joint chamber could be a suitable measure to help minimize the risk of divergence in the jurisprudence of the two tribunal systems, particularly on ICSC matters. 

According to the Secretary-General, maintaining the status quo carries significant risks for the cohesion and consistency of the United Nations Common System on ICSC-related challenges, which in turn carries harmful repercussions for organizations and staff. The Secretary-General further cautions against the possibility of future similar scenarios concerning the Commission’s forthcoming assessment and review of the compensation system. 

It is worth recalling that the UN Secretariat has a two-tiered judicial system (UNDT and UNAT), and the General Assembly elects its judges. In contrast, the ILOAT has one Tribunal, is not part of the United Nations administration of justice system, and the General Assembly does not elect its judges.

To understand the far-reaching encroachment attempts of the Secretary-General on the independence of the United Nations Appeals Tribunal and the ILO Appeals Tribunals, one needs only to read Annexes III and IV, which contain the comments of both Tribunals on the Secretary-General’s proposal and report in addition to the subtly hidden and buried WIPO comments.

With respect to ILOAT, the Tribunal referred to its 25 July 2022 and 12 April 2023 letters. It noted that it continues to consider that the Secretary-General’s proposal was “fundamentally unsound and should not be pursued”.

Furthermore, the ILOA Tribunal noted that the new proposals formulated in the report “would limit, in a most problematic way, its existing competence in reviewing matters arising from the United Nations common system.”  

The ILOAT further noted that many fundamental concerns regarding the proposed creation of a joint chamber, as expressed in these previous letters, have not been adequately understood and addressed. 

For transparency reasons, we request the Secretary-General to make these letters available to member states during the presentation of the report to the 78th GA session to guarantee that the views of the ILOAT are objectively and thoroughly conveyed to member states instead of being tailored by the Secretary-General and his legal counsels as they see fit in their report.

With regards to encouraging informal exchanges between the United Nations Appeals Tribunal and the International Labour Organization (ILO) Administrative Tribunal, the Tribunal noted with some concern that the Secretary-General’s report 

“seems to suggest that the exchanges between the Tribunals would have to be “transparently communicated” and/or should be “facilitated and administered” by the United Nations and ILO. 

Such administrative arrangements do not appear to us to be a means of allowing informal exchanges of the type contemplated by the General Assembly but rather an entirely inappropriate attempt to control or regulate these exchanges. 

If so, they would plainly Not respect the two Tribunals’ full independence and, moreover, could undermine the conditions required for really productive contacts between them. 

This Tribunal does not see any need for the involvement of anyone, beyond the Tribunals’ respective Registries, in the organization of such exchanges, apart from the provision of funding.”

That is a powerful statement indeed from the ILOAT. Not sure if the representatives of member states have the time to read these annexes buried at the deep end of the Secretary-General’s report.

With respect to the comments of the United Nations Appeals Tribunal, they were also relegated to the bottom end of this report and included under Annex III.

The UNAT referred to its earlier submissions of 12 April and 5 June 2023 in which it had noted that the fundamental structure under which each of the United Nations and International Labour Organization judicial bodies operated was considerably different. 

On the scope of jurisdiction, the UNAT reiterated its earlier observations to the Secretary-General that Assembly resolutions bind the Appeals Tribunal, and as such, the Assembly resolutions, together with the statute of the Appeals Tribunal, limit the Appeals Tribunal’s scope of judicial review of certain cases related to human resources management and administrative and budgetary matters. Furthermore, the Appeals Tribunal is an appellate body, while UNDT is a tribunal of first instance. These significant structural and jurisdictional characteristics do not constrain ILOAT. 

“The Appeals Tribunal has stated its concern that the proposed approaches, including the joint chamber, do not address these fundamental differences. The proposed amendments do not appear to acknowledge or address the principled arguments made against this proposal by UNAT, UNDT and ILOAT. “

On the scope of Independence of the Appeals Tribunal, the provision that preliminary rulings of the joint chamber will be binding on the United Nations Tribunals and ILOAT directly and pointedly impacts the independence of each of the tribunals. 

“This is further underscored by the prohibition against judges meeting in person to discuss and decide such cases to economize resources.

This is contrary to the internationally accepted process for judicial decision-making and directly impacts the independence of judges to deliberate and exercise their jurisdiction. It ignores or at least underestimates the collegial judicial method, especially where judges are from different nations with different legal systems. 

A joint chamber must be adequately resourced, including provision for judges to hold hearings in person and to deliberate in person.

These operational decisions must be made by the judges themselves, who are best placed to decide how cases are handled. Indeed, even more fundamentally, it is a matter of judicial independence that the judges be able to do so and not be directed by the Organization as to how they hear and decide cases.” 

Now, we turn to a carefully placed hyperlink in the Secretary-General’s report on page 32, Annex VI, which no one will click or read because the Secretary-General does not want to highlight the degree of objection to his proposal.

This hyperlink leads us to the positions and views of individual stakeholders such as UNISERV and CCISUA, but one organization’s strong views stood out and we saw it fit to include an excerpt from their comments below.

Excerpt from WIPO views

The review was requested by the UN General Assembly in response to five judgments issued by the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT) with which it was clearly dissatisfied. This request was made at a time when the General Assembly did not yet know which way the United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT), and ultimately the United Nations Appeals Tribunal (UNAT), would rule on the same matter that had been reviewed by the ILOAT in the above-mentioned judgments. 

“In addition, in criticizing the ILOAT’s judgments in such a formal and public manner, and by going as far as to request a review of the entire jurisdictional set up of the UN common system, strong signals were being sent to the judges on the UN Tribunals, when the matter before them was still sub judice, not to follow the ILOAT’s reasoning, which some may consider to be an interference with the judicial independence of the UN judiciary.

WIPO strongly objects to the proposal to establish a joint chamber, which, in short, undermines the authority and independence of the tribunals, as well as the legitimacy of their decisions – bedrock principles of the rule of law.

In addition, the reconfiguration of the jurisdictional set up constitutes a disproportionate and ill-conceived response to the perceived challenge that the review is seeking to address. 

The real issue, of course, is the dissatisfaction with the fact that an independent tribunal had indirectly contested the ICSC’s alleged decision-making authority on post adjustment matters, which, according to its Statute, lies with the UN General Assembly. 

WIPO requests that its comments be reflected in the report to the UN General Assembly”

And so it goes. WIPO’s comments were not reflected in the Secretary-General’s report and were nowhere to be seen except through a vanishing hyperlink at the end of the report.

How many resources, both financial and human, were spent in the past two years on the Secretary-General’s proposal despite the early warning signs cautioning them against it from all stakeholders? Why do the Secretary-General and his ever-expanding legal team insist on meddling with the system of administration of justice?

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations – a discerning statement

On the 1st of May 2023, for the second part of the 77th’s resumed General Assembly session, the Secretary-General of the United Nations presented his report on the Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

One of the Secretary-General’s statements in his report stood out. Stood out. The Secretary-General stated that:

“No allegations could indicate that there are ineffective complaint mechanisms, that these do not exist, that victims do not report allegations because they do not believe they will be protected, or that they believe that no action will be taken.”

The Secretary-General continues by alluding that while the number of allegations may provide insights into trends, the progress of the United Nations, Member States, and partners with regards to SEA must be measured by so many other indicators such as communicating standards, training, vetting, risk management, and mitigation measures … and so on.

Mr. Secretary-General, I beg to differ.

On behalf of thousands of victims and survivors of sexual harassment and exploitation by the United Nations staff and personnel and non-UN personnel, those victims/survivors who willingly chose not to report allegations because they witnessed first-hand the lack of action and the retaliation against their colleagues who dared to do so: 

That is a bold and defiant statement to make before those survivors and the General-Assembly.

Effective reporting mechanisms for SEA do not exist.

Victims are not protected.

Perpetrators are protected.                                    

Retaliation is rampant.

Accountability simply does not exist. 

We know the names of the victims, and we know the names of the perpetrators.

All of them were protected. Many are still working with the United Nations. Under your leadership. 

Fearless. 

Protected. 

Rampant. 

Predators.

You seem to indicate in your report that the number of SEA allegations received is not a good measurement tool and that few or no allegations do not indicate that an adequate prevention programme exists.

However, the United Nations ACABQ reviewing your report begged to differ: 

The ACABQ in its report, specifically underscored again 

“its concern regarding the increased number of allegations and recalled the collective and unanimous position of the General Assembly that one substantiated case of sexual exploitation and abuse is one case too many”

One substantiated case of sexual exploitation and abuse is one case too many indeed.

Therefore, data on allegations matter.

“In 2022 only, 243 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse related to United Nations staff and affiliated personnel were received across the United Nations system, and 291 allegations relating to personnel of implementing partners not under the authority of the United Nations were reported.”

Source: Your Report.

NB: Those allegations belong to those who dared to report them. 

There is no estimated data for persons who have been sexually exploited, abused, or harassed and did not dare to report it.

Switzerland’s statement on the 1st of May before the General Assembly confirms this:

“Firstly, we are deeply concerned about the large number of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse that continue to emerge each year. This indicates that much remains to be done before we achieve a lasting change in culture, behaviour and attitudes in the Organisation. As highlighted by the ACABQ in its report, the implementation of the zero-tolerance policy for inaction requires first and foremost awareness of the applicable standards and prohibitions by all staff and a safe environment for reporting cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. “

Conclusion: Data Matters.

Then you go on in the same SEA report presented to the General Assembly stating that your SEA strategy prioritizes 

“upholding the rights and dignity of victims and ending impunity through reporting and investigations.”

What rights and dignity are you referring to?

In your report, you refer to the success of the “WHO webinars as part of the “No Excuse!” campaign which attracted more than 30,000 participants in 2022, and its training sessions on a “speak-up” culture which were attended by 2,000 personnel

But a Congolese survivor from the WHO predators begs to differ:

“How many times do I have to speak before (the doctors) at WHO responsible for the sexual abuse are punished?” she asked. “If WHO does not take radical measures, we will conclude that the organization has been made rotten by rapists.”

When the same survivor states that “money will not erase the wounds I have in my heart.” She reported the alleged misconduct to the WHO in 2019, but never received a response.

What end of impunity are you referring to?

When two weeks ago, the WHO  made the below announcement:

 “I am pleased to announce that Mlitzke . . . and Yao . . . have returned to their duties at HQ Geneva,” 

What end of impunity are you referring to?

When “Jeanette, a woman who says she was impregnated by a WHO doctor said she was pressured into having an abortion, which nearly killed her. She said she is waiting for the WHO to punish the doctor responsible for her pregnancy and has had no offers of financial compensation.”

What end of impunity are you referring to?

When the statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China responding to your report on SEA presented to the GA says:

“We call for strengthening efforts towards ensuring that the United Nations will not remain silent or passive in the face of reported incidents as well as protecting and supporting victims of SEA through adopting a victim-centered approach.”

You also reported that to reinforce ongoing system-wide efforts, in September 2022, the position of the Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse was strengthened by revising the terms of the appointment from a when-actually-employed basis to a full-time position at the Under-Secretary-General level. 

But the ACABQ report again begged to differ:

“The Committee notes specifically a lack of clarity as to the standing of the Special Coordinator in the overall sexual exploitation and abuse prevention architecture, including any changes in that regard that may have resulted from the change to a full-time position modality and the shift of funding to the regular budget.”

Anifa and Jeanette are waiting.

So are thousands of women who were raped, beaten, assaulted, harrased and abused.

Not for another report.

For Real Action.

End Impunity.

NOW.

Who is responsible for the obstruction of justice in the United Nations?

Note: This post is to be read in conjunction with the previous one.

The UNDT has recently proposed amendments to its rule of procedures Annex I of the Report of the Secretary-General on Administration of Justice A/77/156. In its introductory paragraph, page 30, the UNDT recalled that the “current rules of procedure were adopted before the Tribunal became fully operational and were based more on projection than on feedback from practice”. It makes perfect sense since it’s been twelve years since the new justice system was adopted.

One entity did not like it: the legal offices representing the Secretary-General.

In brief, the UNDT’s proposed amendments to its Rules of Procedure restore a more balanced approach to justice, benefitting staff, and helping curtail the SG’s maneuvering in court proceedings, which are many. One consistent tactic of the legal offices is to, for example, refrain from calling witnesses during the oral hearing to avoid their cross-examination by the Judges and the opposing parties and thus to limit the evidence to written testimonies or to OIOS reports.

Read and decide which entity aims to enhance a culture of accountability and justice and which one continuously aims to obstruct it.

Article 16 on Oral Hearing: the UNDT is moving towards making the Oral Hearing compulsory whenever there is an appeal contesting the imposition of a disciplinary measure. All statements, allegations, and witnesses must stand the test of scrutiny before the Tribunal.

The Secretary-General objects and recommends that the corresponding paragraph be entirely deleted. (ref. p. 55 – A/77/156)

Article 17 on Evidence: the UNDT reinforces the principle of evaluating evidence to ensure it meets the requisite standard of proof by applying logic and common sense. The UNDT will further draw adverse inferences from a refusal of a party to disclose a document in their possession and may thus consider the facts alleged by the opposing party as proven. As we all know, most of these documents are in the control of management, not staff. 

The Secretary-General objects and considers that the UNDT is attempting to rewrite the staff regulations and rules. According to the SG, such changes must be considered under the UNDT Statute and not its rules of procedure and are thus subject to GA approval. (Ref. p.55 p.56 -A/77/156).

Article 26 on Protection of personal data in publication of decisions: The UNDT seeks to use the initials of staff members instead of their names appearing in all judgments similar to the ILOAT practice and in justified circumstances to anonymize it. OSLA has supported this proposal and noted that the publication of the names causes long-term irreparable harm and prejudice to an applicant, even when the applicant is successful. (Ref. p.57 p. 58 – A/77/156).

The Secretary-General objects to this proposal citing issues of transparency. A review of all names published in UNDT and UNAT will show that not a single senior manager’s name was published in UNDT/UNAT judgments, but it was always the names of the staff members accused of misconduct. 

With this pattern, the GA resolution A/RES/65/253* that had envisaged more than a decade ago : 

“….to establish a new, independent, transparent, professionalized, adequately resourced and decentralized system of administration of justice consistent with the relevant rules of international law and the principles of the rule of law and due process to ensure respect for the rights and obligations of staff members and the accountability of managers and staff members alike”

will soon become obsolete, and justice will be denied to all staff members.