In 2018, UNRWA confronted a $446 million funding crisis. Its leadership launched an international campaign to save the Agency. In 2026, with a reported cash shortfall of approximately $70 million, its current leadership appears to have replaced fundraising with a strategy of dismissals. Whether this reflects a failure of leadership or something more deliberate is the question.
In January 2018, the United States dramatically reduced its financial support to UNRWA, plunging the Agency into what was then the most serious funding crisis in its history. The projected shortfall reached an extraordinary $446 million.
At the time, the Commissioner-General was Pierre Krähenbühl.
He could have argued that the financial situation was unsustainable, that the Agency had no alternative but to reduce its workforce, and that the international community had left him with no choice.
Instead, he surrounded himself with enablers and embarked on an international fundraising effort to preserve UNRWA’s services.
By November 2018, UNRWA announced that donors had contributed or pledged an additional $425 million, reducing the remaining shortfall to $21 million. Forty countries and institutions had increased their contributions or made new pledges.[1]
Krähenbühl did not achieve this through speeches alone. Working with a dedicated team that helped drive the fundraising effort, he pursued extensive diplomatic engagement at the highest political levels, negotiated with donors, participated in extraordinary ministerial conferences, secured bilateral funding agreements and led an international fundraising campaign.
Eight years later, Christian Saunders, UNRWA’s Acting Commissioner-General, is invoking a minor financial crisis to justify the prospect of mass reductions in staffing and services.
In a recent interview, Saunders put the deficit at about $70 million and warned that, without additional financing, he would have to take regrettable measures to ensure the Agency could continue paying salaries through the end of the year.[2]
A deficit is not, in itself, proof that dismissing staff is the only available response.
The question is what UNRWA’s leadership has done to raise the money before deciding that the workforce must bear the consequences.
What Krähenbühl Actually Did
On 22 January 2018, just days after Washington announced its dramatic funding reduction, Krähenbühl travelled to Gaza and launched #DignityIsPriceless, a global fundraising campaign with a target of $500 million.[3]
The message was straightforward: UNRWA’s schools, clinics and humanitarian services had to remain operational.
He then pursued a massive international diplomatic effort.
In March 2018, UNRWA, together with Jordan, Sweden and Egypt, organized an extraordinary ministerial conference in Rome to mobilize international support.
Krähenbühl subsequently reported that UNRWA had participated in conferences and summits in Brussels, Cairo, Dhahran, Dhaka and Istanbul, and had held meetings with approximately 25 presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers, as well as Pope Francis.[4]
These key meetings formed part of a coordinated strategy to secure political and financial commitments from governments and international institutions.
The Agency also asked existing donors to advance their scheduled contributions to avert a cash-flow crisis. Twenty-five partners responded.
It pursued new financing channels, including initiatives involving Zakat contributions during Ramadan.
In May 2018, Krähenbühl signed a $50 million agreement with the Qatar Fund for Development.
In September, he signed a $5.4 million agreement with Japan.
In November, he signed a further $50 million agreement with the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre, followed by four agreements worth $63 million with the Saudi Fund for Development.[5]
These agreements involved different funding streams, and their values cannot simply be added to the year’s reported fundraising total. Nevertheless, they provide concrete evidence of sustained bilateral donor engagement.
By the end of 2018, the Agency had substantially overcome the extraordinary funding shock.
The financial response was accompanied by austerity measures, including $92 million in expenditure reductions. Krähenbühl did not avoid difficult financial decisions. But those decisions formed part of a wider resource-mobilization strategy rather than replacing it. And most importantly, Krähenbühl did not terminate a single staff member’s fixed-term contract during the funding crisis (though short term project staff were terminated).
In January 2019, Krähenbühl launched a $1.2 billion appeal to finance UNRWA’s operations.
In February, he signed an €82 million agreement with the European Union.
In March, he met Indonesia’s Foreign Minister in Amman, where Indonesia announced a $1 million contribution, five times its previous level of support.
In April, he travelled to Oslo for discussions with Norwegian authorities. Norway announced an $11.5 million contribution for UNRWA’s Syria Emergency Appeal.
He also signed agreements with New Zealand and continued addressing donor governments, the Security Council and international conferences.
At the June 2019 pledging conference in New York, 23 donors announced contributions or intentions to contribute.[6]
UNRWA also developed a formal Resource Mobilization Strategy for 2019–2021, aimed at expanding its donor base, diversifying financing and strengthening diplomatic engagement.[7]
Not every pledge resulted from Krähenbühl’s personal intervention, nor was every initiative successful. UNRWA continued to face significant financial difficulties in 2019.
But the public record establishes that the Agency had an identifiable, structured and internationally visible fundraising effort.
The contrast with the present situation raises the uncomfortable question.
What Has Christian Saunders Done?
On 17 June 2026, he addressed the Agency’s Advisory Commission and called for political and financial support.
On 30 June, he addressed the UNRWA pledging conference in New York.
In August, he accompanied the CEO of the Saudi Fund for Development during a visit to UNRWA installations in Jordan.
And on 24 September, he addressed a ministerial meeting on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly, warning of a $100 million cash-flow deficit for 2026.[8]
Where is the comparable international fundraising campaign?
Which donor capitals has Saunders personally visited to negotiate additional financing?
Which bilateral agreements has he concluded?
How much new funding has been secured through initiatives undertaken under his leadership? Did he assemble a fundraising team around him, or is he limiting himself to his own efforts?
Where is the publicly identifiable emergency resource-mobilization plan designed specifically to preserve existing services and employment?
And what efforts have been made to persuade donors who reduced or suspended contributions to restore their financial support?
The Agency’s leadership is responsible for demonstrating the extent and results of its donor negotiations. Yet no comprehensive public account of those efforts, the agreements concluded or the additional funding secured has been presented.
If UNRWA could mobilize hundreds of millions of dollars during the 2018 crisis, it is reasonable to ask what comparable efforts are being pursued today.
The answer cannot simply be that donors are unwilling to contribute. That proposition must be supported by evidence of actual approaches, negotiations and refusals.
This discussion takes place against an extraordinary political backdrop and the sustained efforts by the Israeli government to dismantle UNRWA operations and challenge its continued existence.
In these circumstances, decisions that reduce UNRWA’s workforce and operational capacity carry consequences extending far beyond the Agency’s payroll. They affect its ability to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly.
If UNRWA’s operational capacity is progressively reduced, the practical result may advance an objective openly pursued by those seeking to end the Agency’s role, irrespective of whether that is the intention of its management.
The comparison between Pierre Krähenbühl’s leadership in 2018–2019 and Christian Saunders’s leadership in 2026 thus raises a legitimate and pressing question.
Is Christian Saunders simply failing to exercise the leadership required to mobilize international funding for UNRWA, or are his decisions contributing to a deliberate strategy to dismantle the Agency from within?
The established political realities are still the same. Israel’s opposition to UNRWA’s continued operations is well documented, and the United States has continued to withdraw financial support and adopt policies that have severely constrained the Agency.
If Saunders maintains that financial necessity leaves him no alternative but to reduce the workforce, he should be able to produce a comprehensive record of the fundraising efforts undertaken to avoid that outcome.
If those efforts have been inadequate, the question is one of leadership competence and accountability. It also raises a more fundamental question: why was Christian Saunders appointed to lead an Agency whose survival depends on high-level political diplomacy and international resource mobilization, given his limited background in political and diplomatic leadership? What qualifications and considerations informed that appointment, and who should be held accountable for it?
If, on the other hand, evidence establishes that viable alternatives were knowingly disregarded in pursuit of an objective to diminish UNRWA’s operational capacity, the implications would be considerably more serious.
The distinction must be investigated.
UNRWA can be dismantled not only by those who openly demand its abolition, but also through successive decisions that progressively deprive it of the personnel, resources and operational capacity required to survive.
The question is therefore whether UNRWA’s current leadership is doing everything reasonably possible to prevent that outcome or whether its decisions are helping to bring it about.
There is a fundamental difference between managing a financial crisis and managing the decline of an organization.
The first requires exhausting available avenues to secure the resources needed to fulfil its mandate.
The second risks treating the progressive reduction of services and personnel as an acceptable long-term solution.
Pierre Krähenbühl’s record in 2018 and 2019 provides a documented example of international resource mobilization in response to an extraordinary financial emergency.
Christian Saunders must now explain what comparable measures he has undertaken, what they have achieved and why they have not been sufficient.
References
[1] UNRWA, November 2018, UNRWA Commissioner-General Thanks Partners for Remarkable Response in Face of Unprecedented Financial Crisis. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-commissioner-general-thanks-partners-remarkable-response-face
[2] Anadolu Agency, October 2026, interview with Christian Saunders concerning UNRWA’s financial crisis. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/interview-unrwa-head-warns-of-looming-gaza-winter-crisis-urges-europe-to-pressure-israel/4094315
[3] UNRWA, 22 January 2018, UNRWA Launches #DignityIsPriceless Global Fundraising Campaign in Gaza. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-launches-dignity-priceless-global-fundraising-campaign-gaza
[4] UNRWA, June 2018, Statement by the UNRWA Commissioner-General at the Pledging Conference. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/statement-unrwa-commissioner-general-pledging-conference
[5] UNRWA, 2018, announcements concerning agreements with Qatar, Japan, the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre and the Saudi Fund for Development. https://www.wam.ae/en/article/hszr7sjb-saudi-arabia-donates-us63-million-unrwa-projects
[6] United Nations, 25 June 2019, Donors Announce Contributions at Pledging Conference as UNRWA Faces Continuing Funding Crisis. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/donors-announce-contributions-at-pledging-conference-as-unrwa-faces-continuing-funding-crisis-press-release/
[7] UNRWA, Resource Mobilization Strategy 2019–2021. https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/rms_2019-2021_eng_final_10292019.pdf
[8] United Nations, 24 September 2026, remarks by Christian Saunders at the ministerial meeting on UNRWA. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/remarks-by-unrwa-24sep26/
Additional official sources:
UNRWA, 2019 Annual Operational Report: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unrwa-annual-operational-report-2019-for-the-reporting-period-01-january-31-december-2019/
UNRWA, 17 June 2026, statement by Christian Saunders: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/statement-by-unrwa-17jun26/
