Leadership, power, and the deliberate exclusion at the heart of the Palestine refugee system
With less than two months remaining in UNRWA CG’s mandate, and as he appears to be leveraging the closing phase of his term to take far-reaching executive decisions that risk dismantling UNRWA, attention is already shifting to the question of succession.
Who will be the next Commissioner-General? A German? An Italian? A Swiss? A British national? An American? A Swedish or Norwegian candidate?
And yet, conspicuously absent from the discussion is any mention of an Arab national or even a candidate from a host country. Why is that?
Why is it that an agency with such a unique mandate, employing approximately 31,000 Palestine refugees to serve nearly five million Palestine refugees across Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan must invariably be headed by a Western European or American Commissioner-General?
Why is it considered inconceivable for an Arab national, more specifically a candidate from one of the host countries, to preside over an agency that operates almost entirely on their territory, serves their populations, and relies so heavily on their political and social environment?
Take, by contrast, one of the five regional commissions operating within the United Nations system: the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). ESCWA serves 21 Arab States across Western Asia and North Africa, and its Executive Secretary has consistently been appointed from among nationals of those very member States.
So why is UNRWA, an agency operating almost exclusively in the Arab region and serving a Palestinian refugee population, invariably presided over by a Western-led Commissioner-General?
I argue that this is neither incidental nor accidental. It is deliberate.
The Commissioner-General of UNRWA is appointed by the Secretary-General following consultations with UNRWA’s Advisory Commission, which includes major donors and host countries. No formal vote or approval by the General Assembly is required. The General Assembly is merely informed of the appointment and has no authority to confirm or reject the candidate.
While UNRWA operates under the authority of the General Assembly, executive authority, including appointment power rests with the Secretary-General. This results in a highly centralized process, devoid of any competitive or transparent selection procedure, with no public shortlisting or clearly articulated criteria.
In practice, political considerations such as donor confidence, geopolitical alignments, and host-state sensitivities play a decisive role in the appointment of UNRWA’s Commissioner-General.
UNRWA’s Commissioner-General is, in effect, a political appointment of the Secretary-General, insulated from direct General Assembly approval.
By contrast, in regional commissions such as ESCWA, the Executive Secretary is appointed through a politically negotiated, intergovernmental process, requiring General Assembly approval and explicit regional buy-in.
This distinction goes directly to questions of accountability, independence, and political leverage and is particularly consequential in the current crisis context.
Since its establishment, ESCWA has been led almost exclusively by Arab nationals, appointed from within the region it serves. By contrast, UNRWA has never been led by a Palestinian, a host-country national, or even an Arab national from a major regional donor State. Its Commissioners-General have been overwhelmingly Western, predominantly European and North American.
This raises, once again, the central question: why has UNRWA never been led by an Arab?
There is no legal rule preventing the appointment of a Palestinian, a Jordanian, a Lebanese, a Syrian, or an Arab national from a major UNRWA donor State. And yet, over more than seven decades, no such appointment has ever occurred.
Instead, UNRWA’s leadership has followed a remarkably consistent pattern: Western nationality, diplomatic pedigree, acceptability to major donor States, and a perceived political “distance” from the refugee community.
The underlying reasons are rarely stated explicitly, yet they are well understood within the system.
First, UNRWA is politically inconvenient. It embodies an unresolved refugee question that powerful States would prefer to manage, contain, or quietly sunset. A Commissioner-General drawn from the refugee community or even from a host State would be more difficult to pressure, harder to discipline, and less easily aligned with donor red lines.
Second, funding equals leverage. Unlike other United Nations entities or regional commissions such as ESCWA, UNRWA is funded almost entirely through voluntary contributions. Western donors do not merely fund the Agency; they actively shape its operating space. Leadership, in turn, is selected accordingly.
Third, control is mistaken for neutrality.
Western leadership is presented as “impartial,” while regional leadership is implicitly framed as “political.” This assumption is neither neutral nor defensible: it simply reflects whose politics are normalized.
Fourth, there is an unspoken trust deficit.
Palestinians are trusted to teach, heal, vaccinate, rebuild and increasingly, to absorb institutional collapse. But they are not trusted to lead.
So who, then, controls UNRWA? And does this amount to a form of colonization of the Palestine cause?
If colonization is understood as the systematic removal of decision-making power from those most directly affected, the answer becomes difficult to avoid
UNRWA serves Palestinians, is staffed overwhelmingly by Palestinians, and operates almost entirely in Palestinian camps and communities; yet it has been led, without exception, by outsiders, overwhelmingly Western.
Those who decide are not those who live with the consequences. Indeed, leadership matters: it shapes how crises are framed, how staff are treated, how cuts are imposed, and how accountability is exercised or avoided. This is precisely what we are witnessing today through mass suspensions, terminations, and salary cuts implemented under the current Commissioner-General of UNRWA.
While the Commissioner-General of UNRWA should, in principle, be accountable to the Palestinian communities the Agency serves, the current governance structure ensures the opposite. By reporting directly to the Secretary-General rather than to the General Assembly, accountability flows upward: to donors and political power centers rather than downward to the Palestinian communities most affected by UNRWA’s decisions.
Why is Arab leadership considered acceptable for every United Nations body operating in the region except the one mandated to serve Palestinians?
Three factors are at play: First, a fear of political alignment with the refugee cause. Second, a fear of challenging donor orthodoxy. Third and most consequential, a deliberate preference to keep UNRWA administratively weak and politically contained.
Why?
Because a strong, regionally rooted UNRWA leadership would be harder to dismantle.
With less than three months remaining in the current Commissioner-General’s mandate, the most consequential question confronting the Secretary-General and host countries alike is not who comes next, but why Arab leadership continues to be excluded.







